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FORCED MIGRATION AFTER PARIS COP21:
EVALUATING THE “CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT
COORDINATION FACILITY”
Phillip Dane Warren*
Climate change represents, perhaps, the greatest challenge of the
twenty-ﬁrst century. As temperatures and sea levels rise, governments
around the world will face massive and unprecedented human
displacement that international law currently has no mechanism to
address. While estimates vary, the scope of the migration crisis that the
world will face in the coming decades is startling. In addition to losing
their homes, climate change migrants, under current law, will
encounter a refugee system governed by a decades-old Refugee
Convention that offers neither protection nor the right to resettle in a
more habitable place. Armed with the most recent developments in
international climate change law following the December 2015 Paris
climate conference (COP21), this Note considers which of the existing
bodies in the United Nations is best equipped to address forced
migration caused by climate change. Inspired by the negotiations
leading up to the Paris Conference, this Note advocates for a Climate
Change Displacement Coordination Facility, housed within the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to
protect the rights of displaced persons. Finally, this Note maps out an
institutional architecture and a long-term vision for a Displacement
Coordination Facility. As opposed to an amendment of the 1951
Refugee Convention or a new rights-based treaty for climate migration,
a Facility housed within the UNFCCC provides the greatest possible
ﬂexibility, autonomy, and cultural retention for climate change
migrants while still protecting their essential human rights.
INTRODUCTION
[N]o challenge . . . poses a greater threat to future generations than climate
change.1
Climate change represents perhaps the largest threat to future
generations, and it has become widely accepted that human activity is the
root of the problem.2 One of the most serious threats global leaders must
*. J.D. Candidate 2017, Columbia Law School.
1. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address ( Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/
remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [http://perma.cc/H5BP-WSWE].
2. While some uncertainty remains, it has become widely accepted that human
activity is the primary cause of climate change, and this Note follows this understanding.
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face in the midst of climate change is the reality of forced global
migration, especially for Paciﬁc island nations.3 Because the bulk of
emissions causing climate change come from more developed nations
like the United States (though this is quickly changing4), more
developed nations arguably face a moral obligation to assist climate
change migrants.5 However, international law currently provides no legal
protection for those displaced by climate change or other environmental
disasters.6 Unlike conﬂict refugees, such as those from war-torn Syria,
climate migrants from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) that are
swallowed by rising seas will never be able to return home,7 presenting a
massive and virtually unprecedented legal issue.8
Global leaders have long recognized that “the global nature of
climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries”
to create an “effective and appropriate international response.”9 Just as
leaders seek to forge a cooperative international solution to reduce
emissions, the effects of climate change—including forced migration—
See Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Human Inﬂuence on
Climate Clear, IPCC Report Says 1 (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_
events/docs/ar5/press_release_ar5_wgi_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZDL8-B723] (“It is
extremely likely [95–100%, according to the Press Release] that human inﬂuence has been
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.”).
3. See Leonard A. Nurse et al., Small Islands, in Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability 1613, 1639–40 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap29_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/AUS3-PYUX] (noting
sea-level rise “poses one of the most widely recognized climate change threats to low-lying
coastal areas on islands”).
4. See Alister Doyle, China to Surpass US as Top Cause of Modern Global Warming,
Reuters (Apr. 13, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/climatechange-china-idUKL5N0
XA1JD20150413 [http://perma.cc/J376-7M9R] (“China’s cumulative greenhouse gas
emissions since 1990 . . . will outstrip those of the United States in 2015 or 2016 . . . .”).
5. Professor Katrina Wyman argues that while causation issues abound in climate
migration, there may be a moral duty to assist those on small island developing states that
will soon become submerged by sea level rise. See Katrina M. Wyman, Are We Morally
Obligated to Assist Climate Change Migrants?, 7 Law & Ethics Hum. Rts. 185, 197–99
(2013).
6. See infra section II.A (discussing gap in legal protection under existing 1951
Refugee Convention).
7. See Michael B. Gerrard, Dir., Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law
Sch., Statement at the Security Council Open Arria Formula Meeting on the Role of
Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Global Security 1 (June 30, 2015) [hereinafter
Gerrard, Security Council Statement], http://www.spainun.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/Michael-Gerrard_CC_201506.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6UC-EDY2] (“[W]hile the
people who are currently displaced by conﬂict will hopefully be able to return home some
day, the people from areas swallowed by rising seas will never be able to go back.”).
8. See Int’l Bar Ass’n, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate
Disruption 7 (July 2014) (“[T]here are no international law instruments directly
applicable to climate change-related migration.”).
9. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 166 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. For a discussion of the legal underpinnings of
the UNFCCC, see infra section I.C.3.
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must also be addressed at the international level to protect the rights of
those displaced.10 International law, however, currently has no mechanism to address forced migration as a result of climate change.11 People
displaced by the effects of climate change, including rising seas or
natural disasters, will have no choice but to move. Further, they will be
forced to move without any legal protection or right to do so.12 Of
course, political unrest can also cause disastrous migration changes.
During the fall of 2015, the world previewed the devastating effects of a
widespread European refugee crisis. The Syrian civil war has forced
nearly ﬁve million people to ﬂee to other countries.13 Further, while
those displaced from Syria are ﬂeeing war and persecution from their
own government14 (a prerequisite for refugee status under international
treaty law15), climate migrants will not typically be ﬂeeing war or
persecution. As such, the legal protections available to Syrian refugees
will likely be unavailable to those displaced by climate change.16
Although global leaders recently completed an ambitious (albeit
largely nonbinding) climate change agreement in Paris during the
December 2015 Twenty-First Conference of the Parties (COP21),17 the
10. Further, the 1951 Refugee Convention has long provided an internationalprotection regime for more typical refugees from conﬂict and oppression. See infra
section I.B.
11. See infra section II.A.1 (noting those displaced by climate change almost
certainly fall outside existing treaty law). This seems to stem from some combination of
uncertainty as to the exact number of people involved, see infra section I.A.3, the
intersection between climate and immigration policy (typically left to domestic law), and
the reality that much of the migration will occur in the second half of the twenty-ﬁrst
century.
12. See infra section II.A (discussing the gap in international treaty law with respect
to climate migration).
13. See Syria Regional Refugee Response, United Nations High Comm’r for
Refugees, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [http://perma.cc/R38MDN37] (last updated Sept. 3, 2016); see also Patrick Kingsley et al., Syrian Refugee Crisis:
Why Has It Become So Bad?, Guardian (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/sep/04/syrian-refugee-crisis-why-has-it-become-so-bad
[http://perma.cc/
69FN-DNAX] (calling the Syrian refugee crisis “Europe’s biggest refugee movement since
the second world war”).
14. See Somini Sengupta, Migrant or Refugee? There Is a Difference, with Legal
Implications, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/
world/migrants-refugees-europe-syria.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
that most ﬂeeing to Europe are considered refugees under the 1951 Refugee
Convention).
15. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (describing the requirements
under the 1951 Refugee Convention).
16. See infra sections I.B–.C and accompanying text (discussing the legal gap for
climate change migrants).
17. The Conference of the Parties is the “supreme decision-making body of the
Convention” that reviews the progress of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and promotes implementation. See Conference of the Parties
(COP),
United
Nations
Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change,
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agreement considered, but ultimately did not directly address, forced
migration.18 Further, no commenter has addressed climate migration in
light of the crucially important developments in Paris. This Note ﬁlls a
gap in existing literature by ﬂeshing out a role for a Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility, which was recently considered (but
not developed) by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiators leading up to COP21 in Paris.19
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the scope of
climate migration and introduces international actors. Part II surveys the
existing bodies of the United Nations to consider which entity is best
positioned to address forced migration within each entity’s respective
mandate. Finally, Part III focuses on a newly proposed Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility20 and argues for a two-part solution.
This includes short-term soft-law mechanisms and a long-term role for
http://unfccc.int/bodies/
body/6383.php [http://perma.cc/WX9Y-853G] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
18. This is likely because the focus of the meeting was emissions targets and
addressing displacement remains an incredibly complicated issue in its own right. See
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement], http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf [http://perma.cc/38HJ-NGQ3] (requesting
various bodies “develop recommendations” for addressing displacement); see also
Editorial, Goals of the Paris Climate Conference, Wash. Post (Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/goals-of-the-paris-climate-conference/2015/11/29/
0bc2f6e8-92f6-11e5-b5e4-279b4501e8a6_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting primary goals of the Paris Conference). Less than a year after its adoption,
enough countries ratiﬁed the agreement for it to formally enter into force on November
4, 2016. See Paris Agreement—Status of Ratiﬁcation, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php
[http://perma.cc/ZYJ3-RZZN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). The recent election of Donald
Trump to the presidency throws the status of the Paris Agreement into immediate turmoil,
as Trump has indicated that he plans to withdraw the United States from the Agreement.
See Chris Moony, What It Would Really Mean If Trump Pulls the U.S. out of the Paris
Climate Agreement, Wash. Post (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/09/what-it-would-really-mean-if-trump-pulls-theu-s-out-of-the-paris-climate-agreement/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). This Note
builds off of the Paris Agreement but is not premised on the United States’ participation
in the Agreement. The full scope of what a Trump presidency means for environmental
law, and climate change law speciﬁcally, is best left for other commenters.
19. See Ad Hoc Working Grp. on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,
Working Document: Section E—Adaptation and Loss and Damage (Sept. 4, 2015)
[hereinafter Displacement Facility Document], http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/bodies/awg/
application/pdf/adp2-10_e_04sep2015t1900_wds.pdf [http://perma.cc/473U-XST9]
(introducing the concept of a Displacement Coordination Facility). Displacement was only
mentioned in the ﬁnal Paris Agreement text. See Oliver Milman, UN Drops Plan to Move
Climate-Change Affected People, Guardian (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/oct/07/un-drops-plan-to-create-group-to-relocate-climate-changeaffected-people [http://perma.cc/3GPE-W5JS] (discussing Australian opposition but also
noting that “representatives from the US, British and French governments indicat[ed]
they were open to the idea”).
20. See Displacement Facility Document, supra note 19.
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the UNFCCC as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral treaties, with
the U.N. Security Council assisting in an enforcement and stopgap role.21
The scope of forced climate change migration necessitates a comprehensive legal solution; that is precisely what this Note seeks to develop by
exploring one of the timeliest issues in climate change law following the
Paris COP21 meeting.
I. SCOPE OF DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Though some scientiﬁc uncertainty exists at the margins, the factual
link between human activity and climate change is now widely accepted.22
This Part reviews the scientiﬁc connection between human activity,
climate change, and the predicted scope of forced migration. Section I.A
discusses the relationship between climate science and migration, with a
particular focus on climate change “migrants” and current predictions
for the scope of the migration problem.23 Section I.B examines existing
refugee law, namely the 1951 Refugee Convention.24 Section I.C introduces the framework for entities in the U.N. system that could address
climate migration. In sum, Part I provides the backdrop, both in terms of
climate change migration and the existing legal landscape, that informs
the solution proposed in Part III.
A.

Climate Science and the Predicted Scope of Climate Migration

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) determined that it is “extremely likely” (deﬁned as a likelihood of ninety-ﬁveto one-hundred- percent) that human activity is the primary cause of
climate change.25 This section introduces essential climate science to
21. See infra Part III (describing proposal).
22. This is often termed “anthropogenic” climate change. See Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 2, at 1 (ﬁnding that there is a ninetyﬁve- to one-hundred-percent likelihood that human activity caused climate change).
23. This Note does not address the related problem of “statelessness,” which will
occur when a small island nation ceases to have landmass and no longer meets the
technical deﬁnition of statehood, thus implicating U.N. and International Court of Justice
membership. For a full treatment of these issues, see generally Jacquelynn Kittel, The
Global “Disappearing Act”: How Island States Can Maintain Statehood in the Face of
Disappearing Territory, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1207 (arguing for a new multilateral treaty
that creates a “state-in-exile” scheme); Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, When Do States
Disappear?: Thresholds of Effective Statehood and the Continued Recognition of
“Deterritorialized” Island States, in Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of
Rising Seas and a Changing Climate 57 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds.,
2013) (arguing that states may have a moral duty to continue to recognize island states
that lose their territory); Derek Wong, Sovereignty Sunk? The Position of ‘Sinking States’
at International Law, 14 Melb. J. Int’l L. 346 (2014) (discussing the current inability of
international law to appropriately deal with the issue of statelessness).
24. See infra section II.A (discussing the 1951 Refugee Convention and the rights it
guarantees).
25. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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underscore the scope of forced migration, discusses deﬁnitional issues,
and underscores numerical estimates of forced migration.26 While the
deﬁnitional debate might seem semantic, pinning down an exact
deﬁnition is crucial to deﬁning the scope of the solution.27
1. Climate Science and Forced Migration. — Climate change, as deﬁned
by the IPCC, refers to any identiﬁable change in climate over time,
“whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.”28
Nearly all reputable scientists believe that climate change is both occurring and caused by humans.29 However, accepting that greenhouse gas
emissions represent the “dominant cause of the observed warming since
the mid-20th Century,” as the IPCC found,30 is not necessarily the
linchpin of the analysis. Even if climate change was caused by natural
variations in climate,31 which the IPCC resolutely disputes, the world
would still face a migration crisis.32
In the most recent IPCC report on adaptation to climate change, the
panel noted two types of forced migration that will occur: migration as a
response to extreme weather events (likely to increase due to climate
change33) and migration due to “longer-term climate variability and
26. See infra section I.A.2 (describing deﬁnitional controversy over “climate
migrants”).
27. The deﬁnition of the group has important implications for the scope of the
proposed solution; this Note adopts a broad deﬁnition to include internal and external
migration caused by climate change. See infra section I.A.2.
28. Lenny Bernstein et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 30 (Rajendra K.
Pachauri & Andy Reisinger eds., 2008), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/
syr/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/UQ88-W6Y8].
29. See Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 2, at
1 (“It is extremely likely that human inﬂuence has been the dominant cause of the
observed warming since the mid-20th century.”). While scientists might often face conﬂicts
of interest, much of the climate-change-denial science can be tied back to fossil-fuel
interests. See Eric Roston, Unearthing America’s Deep Network of Climate Change
Deniers, Bloomberg (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1130/unearthing-america-s-deep-network-of-climate-change-deniers [http://perma.cc/XA5JDUX5] (discussing a recent study empirically linking groups with fossil-fuel interests to
funding the denial of climate change).
30. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 Synthesis
Report: Summary for Policymakers 4 (2015), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/
ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [http://perma.cc/XX86-4EXK].
31. See Jocelyn Kiley, Ideological Divide over Global Warming as Wide as Ever, Pew
Research Ctr.: Fact Tank (June 16, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/
06/16/ideological-divide-over-global-warming-as-wide-as-ever/ [http://perma.cc/U34YHVE6] (discussing a faction of Americans that believe climate change is caused by natural
variations in climate, rather than human activity).
32. However, the anthropogenic nature of climate change might affect the responsibility of more developed nations.
33. See Kevin E. Trenberth, John T. Fasullo & Theodore G. Shepherd, Attribution of
Climate Extreme Events, 5 Nature Climate Change 725, 727 (2015) (noting that
Superstorm Sandy, which caused $65 billion in damages in New York City, was “a bigger,
more intense storm” because of higher sea surface temperatures).
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change” (presumably from sea level rise) that will envelop small island
nations.34 Climate change can create instability in other ways, including
changing precipitation patterns (leading to desertiﬁcation), melting
polar ice caps, and increasing the frequency of extreme weather events
(including storms, heat waves, droughts, etc.).35 Some have even argued
that forced migration due (in part) to climate change has already
occurred, speciﬁcally in Somalia in the 1990s36 and in Syria during the
fall of 2015.37 The cause of these events remains hotly contested,38 which
highlights complex causation issues associated with pinning a particular
weather event on climate change39 or singling out an individual’s choice
to migrate.40 In sum, even if climate change is not the sole or primary
cause of instability following a weather event, it makes bad situations
much worse and will undoubtedly lead to migration of startling
magnitude. This is precisely the problem that this Note seeks to address.
2. Deﬁning Climate Migrants and the Academic Terminology Debate. —
Providing a clear deﬁnition for those displaced by climate change has
34. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers 20 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/55PA-TVSW].
35. Id. at 6–8.
36. See Shirley V. Scott & Roberta C.D. Andrade, The Global Response to Climate
Change: Can the Security Council Assume a Lead Role?, 18 Brown J. World Aff.,
Spring/Summer 2012, at 215, 216, 220 (discussing Security Council Resolution 794, S.C.
Res. 794 (Dec. 5, 1992), in which the Security Council framed migration concerns caused
by food insecurity as arguably exacerbated by climate change).
37. See Aryn Baker, How Climate Change Is Behind the Surge of Migrants to Europe,
Time (Sept. 7, 2015), http://time.com/4024210/climate-change-migrants/ [http://
perma.cc/33CS-USAR] (noting that “[f]rom 2006 to 2011, large swaths of Syria suffered
an extreme drought that . . . was exacerbated by climate change” and connecting the
drought to internal migration and social unrest).
38. Compare James Delingpole, For the Last Time, No, the Syrian Crisis Was Not
Caused by Climate Change, Brietbart (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/nationalsecurity/2015/09/09/for-the-last-time-no-the-syrian-crisis-was-not-caused-by-climatechange/ [http://perma.cc/EV74-NRJL] (rejecting a link between climate change and the
Syrian conﬂict), with supra note 37 and accompanying text (referencing convincing
arguments that climate change exacerbated conﬂict conditions). This comparison also
highlights the stark political divisions around climate change.
39. But see Dim Coumou et al., Quasi-Resonant Circulation Regimes and Hemispheric Synchronization of Extreme Weather in Boreal Summer, 111 PNAS 12,331, 12,331
(2014) (ﬁnding an increase in extreme weather events “can largely be explained by a
slowly warming atmosphere”).
40. See Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States Under International Law,
Submission to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative
Action Under the Convention (AWG-LCA 6) 2 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter UNHCR
Climate Report], http://www.unhcr.org/4a1e4d8c2.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (“There is no monocausal relationship between climate change and displacement.”); see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 167, 172 (2013) [hereinafter Wyman, Responses] (noting “migration decisions
often are a response to a combination of factors”).
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proven surprisingly difficult,41 due in large part to causation issues.42 This
Note adopts the terminology “Climate Change Migrants,”43 which refers
to “those whose movement is triggered” in substantial part “by the effects
of climate change.”44 This broad deﬁnition is meant to capture both
internal and external climate migrants, as well as movement occurring
due to slow-onset impacts (such as sea level rise), sudden environmental
disasters, and resource scarcity or conﬂict stemming in part from climate
change. However, the deﬁnition is limited to capture those who move
due to the effects of climate change, as opposed to all environmental
disasters, primarily in order to cabin the issue within the conﬁnes of the
UNFCCC.45 While tedious discussion of deﬁning the group affected by
climate migration might seem overly pedantic, the deﬁnition delineates
the substantive scope of the solution.
As the deﬁnition adopted herein includes internal displacement, it
is key to recognize the distinction between internal and external
displacement. “Internally displaced people,” or those who move within
their own country, will likely make up a large majority of climate-related

41. Claire DeWitte, At Water’s Edge: Legal Protections and Funding for a New
Generation of Climate Change Refugees, 16 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 211, 221–22 (2010)
(noting the “increasingly heated academic debate has focused on possible new deﬁnitions
for people displaced by climate change”).
42. Despite the causation issues, “[i]gnoring environmental migration because of
semantics could have disastrous consequences for the global population.” Amanda A.
Doran, Where Should Haitians Go? Why “Environmental Refugees” Are up the Creek
Without a Paddle, 22 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 117, 129 (2011).
43. Professor Wyman also uses the term “climate change migrants.” Wyman,
Responses, supra note 40, at 178; see also Lauren Nishimura, ‘Climate Change Migrants’:
Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into
Climate Change Adaptation Strategies, 27 Int’l J. Refugee L. 107, 111 (2015) (using the
term “climate change migrants” as well).
44. Nishimura, supra note 43, at 114. While the language “in substantial part”
admittedly creates line-drawing issues, it is meant to avoid a mere tangential connection to
climate change. Consider the complicated categorization of migrants currently moving
from the Marshall Islands to Arkansas. They are ostensibly coming for better job
opportunities, but the reality of their hopeless future in the Marshall Islands undoubtedly
plays a role. See John. D. Sutter, Opinion, You’re Making This Island Disappear, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2015/06/opinions/sutter-two-degrees-marshall-islands/
[http://perma.cc/3PX2-U87E] (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).
45. Limiting the scope to climate change couches the issue within the UNFCCC.
While other commenters may have limited their focus for different reasons, several have
taken a similar approach in deﬁning climate change migrants. See Frank Biermann &
Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to
Protect Climate Refugees, 10 Global Envtl. Pol. 60, 63 (2010) (noting that “for both
analytical and political reasons it is imperative to specify climate refugees as a sub-category
of environmentally induced migrations”); Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting
a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 349, 361 (2009) (focusing “on those who move across state borders because of
climate change”).
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displacement, at least at ﬁrst.46 This deﬁnitional choice improves the
utility of the proposal by including the majority of early migrants but
nevertheless conﬁnes the issue to climate change migration in the
interest of political feasibility. Currently, the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement indicate that “[n]ational authorities
have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and
humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their
jurisdiction.”47 That is, if people were forced to relocate within
Bangladesh, Bangladesh would bear the primary responsibility for
protecting their human rights.48 Deﬁning the group to include all
environmental migration could be perceived as infringing on domestic
law by attempting to control how countries address a broad scope of
internal displacement (rather than displacement caused primarily by
climate change). While the nonbinding Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement cover internal displacement,49 nothing comparable exists
for cross-border climate migration.50
To avoid encroaching on the role of states in addressing internal
displacement,51 some commenters have deﬁned climate change migrants
narrowly to focus only on cross-border displacement. For instance, the
Nansen Initiative, created by Norway and Switzerland, focuses exclusively
on cross-border climate change migration.52 It attempts to form a
46. See UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 3–4.
47. Francis M. Deng (Representative of the Secretary-General), at 6, Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998)
[hereinafter Guiding Principles]; see also UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 4–5
(“States bear the primary duty and responsibility to provide assistance and protection in
all phases of internal displacement . . . for all [internally displaced persons], including
those who have been displaced by the effects of climate change.”).
48. Bangladesh is often cited as a nation likely to be affected dramatically by climate
change displacement, as it represents “a low-lying, densely-populated delta nation, with a
signiﬁcant proportion of its population living in coastal or ﬂood-prone areas.” Jane
McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty Is Not
the Answer, 23 Int’l J. Refugee L. 2, 10–12 (2011) [hereinafter McAdam, Swimming
Against the Tide]. It is estimated that sea level rise will “subsume up to 30 percent of
Bangladesh’s coastal land by 2080.” Id. at 10; see also Gardiner Harris, Borrowed Time on
Disappearing Land, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/
world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-confronts-the-consequences-of-climatechange.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The country’s climate scientists and
politicians have come to agree that by 2050, rising sea levels will inundate some 17 percent
of the land and displace about 18 million people . . . .”).
49. See Guiding Principles, supra note 47.
50. See infra section II.A (discussing this gap in 1951 Refugee Convention); see also
Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at 177–81 (discussing the “rights gap” in existing
international law).
51. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (discussing internal displacement
under current law).
52. See About Us, Nansen Initiative: Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement,
http://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/ [http://perma.cc/T27M-3NKT] [hereinafter
Nansen Initiative, About Us] (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) (focusing on the “legal gap [that]
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nonbinding coalition of states and develop best practices (a “soft-law
approach”53) to protect cross-border climate migrants.54 Similarly, Professors Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini deﬁne the group narrowly to
include cross-border migration from “sudden or gradual environmental
disruption . . . consistent with climate change.”55 Since the vast majority
of displacement will likely be internal (at least in the short term),56 such
a deﬁnition eliminates a sizable percentage of the affected group.
Furthermore, focusing exclusively on cross-border displacement limits
the scope “implicitly within the preoccupations of the ‘developed’ world,
with all of the attendant security concerns—and perhaps even the
xenophobic reactions—that such a stance entails.”57
Having deﬁned the scope broadly, this section now brieﬂy turns to
terminology issues. Authors have used a variety of terms to describe the
affected group, including “climate refugees,”58 “environmental refugees,”59 “climate change migrants,”60 etc. While various commenters have
advocated for the term “climate refugees,”61 the term has received
substantial pushback. Using the term “refugee” could cement and ossify
an outdated term, as has occurred with the 1951 Refugee Convention,62
and unintentionally water down the already tenuous rights of existing
refugees.63 Instead, this Note uses the term “climate change migrants,”64
exists with regard to cross-border movements in the context of disasters and the effects of
climate change”).
53. For a discussion of soft-law approaches, see infra notes 86–89 and accompanying
text.
54. See Nansen Initiative, About Us, supra note 52.
55. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 361.
56. See UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 3–4.
57. David Hodgkinson et al., The Hour When the Ship Comes In: A Convention for
Persons Displaced by Climate Change, Monash U. L. Rev., no. 1, 2008, at 69, 83.
58. See infra note 64 (citing commenters using the term “climate refugees”).
59. See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: Implications for International Law, 27 Wis. Int’l L.J. 607 passim (2009) [hereinafter
Atapattu, Climate Change] (using the term “environmental refugees”); Brittan J. Bush,
Redeﬁning Environmental Refugees, 27 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 553 passim (2013) (using the
same term).
60. See supra note 43 (citing articles using the term “climate change migrants”).
61. See Atapattu, Climate Change, supra note 59, at 627–32.
62. See, e.g., Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International
Law 199 (2012) [hereinafter McAdam, Forced Migration] (“There is a risk that legally
deﬁning a ‘climate refugee’ category may lead to a hardening of the concept, simultaneously deﬁning groups ‘in’ or ‘out’ of protection needs.”).
63. See Atapattu, Climate Change, supra note 59, at 622 (arguing that “an expansion
would devalue the current protection for refugees”); see also David Keane, Graduate
Note, The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the
Meaning of “Environmental Refugees,” 16 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 209, 215 (2004)
(making a similar argument).
64. But see Biermann & Boas, supra note 45, at 63 (using the term “climate refugees”
but noting “there is no consensus deﬁnition”); Angela Williams, Turning the Tide:
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which more accurately describes the situation both legally and practically.
Legally, using the term “refugee” implies rights and privileges under
international law that simply do not exist—nearly all climate migrants
will not qualify for traditional refugee status.65 Practically, since the
majority of displacement will remain internal,66 using the term “refugee”
could unnecessarily confuse the matter.67 Finally, the multicausal nature
of climate change disasters and individual migration decisions cautions
against using the term “refugee.”68
3. Numerical Estimates of Climate Change Migration. — While exact
estimates of the number of people displaced by climate change vary
considerably, the numbers will prove staggering if one includes internal
migration.69 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates
that “between 50 and 200 million people may move by the middle of the
century, either within their countries or across borders, on a permanent
or temporary basis.”70 Earlier estimates ranged from 200 to 250 million
people by the middle of the century.71 Importantly, the majority of those
displaced will likely move gradually and internally, and causation remains
difficult to pin down.72 Even climate change scholar Professor Jane
Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law, 30 Law & Pol’y 502, 502
(2008) (using the term “climate change refugees”); Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at
187 (using the term “climate refugees”).
65. See infra section I.B (explaining the gap in protection for environmentally
displaced persons under existing refugee law).
66. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (discussing internal and external
displacement).
67. Refugee law covers those ﬂeeing persecution from their government and moving
to another nation. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].
68. Although the link between extreme weather events and climate change stands
on ﬁrm ground, pinning individual weather events solely on climate change remains a
dubious proposition. Further, drawing clear causal links between climate events and
individual migration decisions will often prove impossible. See Nansen Initiative, CrossBorder Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: A Protection
Agenda, Draft for Consultation 43 n.2 (2015) [hereinafter Nansen Initiative, Protection
Agenda], http://www.nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/DRAFTNansen-Initiative-Protection-Agenda-for-Consultation-08042015.pdf [http://perma.cc/
EV35-4YF7] (arguing that causation issues cut against term “refugee”); see also UNHCR
Climate Report, supra note 40, at 3–4.
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (providing the adopted deﬁnition).
70. UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 3.
71. See Christian Aid, Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis 5–6 (2007),
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/human-tide.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q6G4-AY7G]
(estimating 250 million people will be displaced); Norman Myers, Environmental
Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 Phil. Transactions Royal Soc’y
London B 609, 609 (2002) (estimating 200 million people will be displaced).
72. See, e.g., McAdam, Forced Migration, supra note 62, at 199 (noting that “it is
inherently fraught to speak of ‘climate change’ as the ‘cause’ of human movement, even
though its impacts may exacerbate existing socio-economic or environmental
vulnerabilities” and that “climate-related movement is likely to be predominantly internal
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McAdam calls these “alarmist ﬁgures,” noting the complex causation
issues associated with giving a clear estimate.73 For example, suppose a
family lives on a small island in the Paciﬁc Ocean and ocean water rises
high enough to make the groundwater undrinkable.74 That family might
ﬁrst move inland multiple times before ﬁnally leaving the country
entirely.75 And when that family moves permanently, the process of
displacement will prove gradual and sporadic.76
The use of a broad and inclusive deﬁnition to capture internal
displacement allows for causation uncertainty. Just as causation issues
abound in deﬁning the group of climate change migrants,77 causation
makes estimating the precise group likely to be displaced nearly impossible.78 The decision to abandon one’s home is often complicated and
multifaceted, except perhaps when sea level rise makes an island nation
completely uninhabitable.79
B.

Introducing the 1951 Refugee Convention: Limited Coverage for Climate
Change Migrants

While some climate migrants will move across borders (similar to
traditional refugees), the vast majority of them will not receive protection
under existing law.80 This section introduces sources of international law
and explores existing refugee law. Major sources of international law
and/or gradual”); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Climate Change and Its Possible
Security Implications, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009) (indirectly linking
climate change and security as a “threat multiplier,” especially in already vulnerable
nations).
73. McAdam, Forced Migration, supra note 62, at 16 n.8.
74. See Nurse et al., supra note 3, at 1632 ﬁg.29-4 (noting the risk of “saline intrusion
into freshwater lenses”); see also Mostafa Mahmud Naser, Climate Change, Environmental
Degradation, and Migration: A Complex Nexus, 36 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 713,
728 (2012) (“Sea level rise will extend areas of salinization of groundwater and estuaries,
resulting in a decrease in freshwater availability for humans and ecosystems in coastal
areas.”).
75. See DeWitte, supra note 41, at 236 (“As sea level rises, residents of coastal
communities will gradually move inland as their land is eroded, disappears, or can no
longer be cultivated.”). However, moving inland is not possible in some atoll nations. See
Marshall Islands, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/place/MarshallIslands [http://perma.cc/7897-KHFW] (last updated May 18, 2016) (“None of the 29 lowlying coral atolls and the ﬁve coral islands in the Marshall group rises to more than 20 feet
(six metres) above high tide.”).
76. See McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 48, at 8 (arguing that
“movement is likely to be predominantly internal and/or gradual, rather than in the
nature of refugee ‘ﬂight’”).
77. See supra section I.A.2 (discussing the deﬁnitional and causation issues associated
with climate migration).
78. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting issues associated with ﬁnding a
single causal link between climate change and individual decisions to migrate).
79. See supra section I.A.1 (discussing climate science and sea level rise).
80. See infra section II.A.1 (explaining why most cross-border climate change migrants will not be protected by the 1951 Convention).
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typically include customary law or a treaty,81 which is deﬁned as “an
international agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law.”82 A convention, like the UNFCCC,83
typically refers to a large multilateral treaty84 that addresses a speciﬁc
topic—like climate change in the case of the UNFCCC—and often
involves international bodies and modifying protocols.85 Soft law, which
plays a large role in this Note, “is generally used to describe international
instruments that their makers recognize are not treaties.”86 In other
words, soft law refers to nonbinding “pledges,” rather than binding
treaties or “contracts.”87 Soft-law mechanisms include things like guiding
principles, such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement88
and the Nansen Initiative.89
The primary international mechanism that protects the legal rights
of displaced persons is the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of
Refugees (“Refugee Convention” or “1951 Convention”),90 which the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carries out.91 The 1951
Convention deﬁnes refugees as:
Any person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country . . . .92
81. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(1)(c)
(Am. Law Inst. 1987).
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
83. UNFCCC, supra note 9. Conventions often include aspirational language and
goals. See id.
84. Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 9 (3d ed. 2013).
85. See International Conventions on Child Labour, United Nations, http://www.
un.org/en/globalissues/brieﬁngpapers/childlabour/intlconvs.shtml [http://perma.cc/
3BFH-5E7Y] (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (“A Convention is an international agreement
between countries. These are usually developed by the United Nations or other
international organizations.”).
86. Aust, supra note 84, at 49–50.
87. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 Am. J. Int’l L.
581, 588–91 (2005).
88. See Guiding Principles, supra note 47.
89. See Nansen Initiative, Protection Agenda, supra note 68.
90. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67. This Convention is the seminal
international law mechanism that protects the rights of refugees; its place in this
discussion is crucial.
91. See infra section I.C.2 (discussing the UNHCR and its mandate).
92. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, art. 1, ¶ (A)(2) (emphasis added).
Note that this deﬁnition requires movement across borders, which eliminates the majority
of early climate change migrants altogether. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text
(discussing internal displacement).

2116

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:2103

Generally speaking, the 1951 Convention grants those deﬁned as
refugees access to the judicial system, public education, and a right to
work.93 Perhaps most importantly, the 1951 Convention includes nonrefoulement protection, which provides that “[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”94 These ﬁve protected statuses (race,
religion, nationality, and membership of a social group or political opinion) derive from the foundational Universal Declaration on Human
Rights.95
The vast majority of climate change migrants will have no recourse
under international law. Under Article I, refugees must have a “wellfounded fear” of persecution coming from their own government on the basis
of “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.”96 This would prove problematic, as climate change
affects all people in a nation regardless of these factors.97 Climate
migrants from less-developed nations will also have a difficult time
proving that persecution came from within their nation,98 especially
because those nations most likely to bear the burden of sea level rise will
be those that did not cause the bulk of emissions driving climate change
in the ﬁrst place.99 The original treaty was drafted just after World War II
to address refugees ﬂeeing into Europe;100 the original drafters did not
93. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, arts. 16, 17, 22, 33, ¶ 1 (guaranteeing
various rights).
94. Id. art. 33, ¶ 1.
95. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10,
1948). This connection to the U.N. General Assembly’s Universal Declaration on Human
Rights reﬂects the postwar environment in which both were passed. See 1951 Refugee
Convention, supra note 67, pmbl.; see also Atapattu, Climate Change, supra note 59, at
624–25, 625 n.90 (discussing the roots and expansion of the 1951 Refugee Convention);
Doran, supra note 42, at 120–22 (same).
96. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, art. 1, ¶ (A)(2).
97. See Jane McAdam, From Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?, 10 Melb. J.
Int’l L. 579, 590–92 (2009) (“The impacts of climate change . . . are largely indiscriminate,
rather than tied to particular characteristics.”).
98. See Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at 179 (noting for environmentally
displaced persons, “[t]heir governments likely will not have abandoned them and indeed
may be actively trying to assist them in dealing with climate change”).
99. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Relationship Between Climate
Change and Human Rights, ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) (“Vulnerability due to geography is often compounded by a low capacity to adapt, rendering many
of the poorest countries and communities particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate
change.”).
100. See Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Introductory Note
to the Convention and Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees 1, 2 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf [http://perma.cc
/7HMH-4RTF] (“The 1951 Convention, as a post–Second World War instrument, was
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contemplate climate change or environmental displacement.101 Finally,
the 1951 Convention focused entirely on refugees that ﬂee one country
for another, making it inapplicable to internal displacement that will
make up the bulk of early climate migration.102
A small subset of climate migrants could fall under the 1951
Convention, but these cases will prove few and far between. In the event
of a natural disaster, victims might ﬂee if “their government has
consciously withheld or obstructed assistance in order to punish or
marginalize them on one of the ﬁve grounds” associated with establishing refugee status.103 They might also ﬁnd protection if a natural
disaster or other climate-related event (such as drought or resource
scarcity) causes violent social conﬂict.104 In both instances, though, the
1951 Convention would only apply to climate migrants because the
circumstances created violent conﬂict or oppression, on its own terms,
with no relation to climate-related disasters.
C.

Relevant Bodies of the U.N. System and Their Mandates

Various bodies of the U.N. system could potentially address forced
climate migration, though none of them can do so effectively without a
dramatic change to current law. These U.N. bodies receive their
mandates from the U.N. Charter (for example, the General Assembly
and Security Council), treaty law (UNFCCC and UNHCR), and even
General Assembly Resolutions (UNHCR, in part). This section brieﬂy
sketches the mandates of these U.N. bodies.
1. General Assembly. — The General Assembly functions as the
primary democratic body of the United Nations, but its role remains
functionally limited by its narrow mandate in the U.N. Charter. Under
the Charter, the General Assembly may discuss and make recommendations (to Members of the United Nations or the Security Council)
on any matter within the scope of the Charter or related to international
peace and security.105 Thus, whereas the Security Council has a far larger
role in the international system,106 the General Assembly is often
originally limited in scope to persons ﬂeeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
within Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed these limitations and thus gave the
Convention universal coverage.”); see also infra note 143 and accompanying text
(discussing the 1967 Amendment to the Refugee Convention).
101. In fact, the term global warming itself did not exist until 1975. See Wallace S.
Broecker, Climatic Change: Are We on the Brink of a Pronounced Global Warming?, 189
Science 460, 460 (1975) (coining the term “global warming” in 1975).
102. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of internal
displacement).
103. UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 9–10. The report acknowledges that
such a situation would be quite rare. Id. at 10.
104. See id at 10.
105. U.N. Charter art. 10–11.
106. See infra section I.C.4 (discussing the expansive role of the Security Council).
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functionally limited to making recommendations and initiating
studies.107
2. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. — While some
climate change migrants will move across borders, the UNHRC has
limited capacity to help them.108 The UNHCR is primarily responsible for
“providing international protection” for refugees, as deﬁned by the 1951
Refugee Convention.109 For the UNHCR to address climate migration
completely, those displaced by climate change would have to qualify as
refugees under the Refugee Convention,110 which is almost certainly not
the case.111
3. UNFCCC. — The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change,112 implemented by the Conference of the Parties,
represents the primary international legal text devoted to combatting
climate change. The UNFCCC is a framework convention under which
future agreements are signed (for example, the Kyoto Protocol113). In
December 2015, the UNFCCC parties met for COP21 in Paris, setting a
goal of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius over preindustrial
temperatures (with surprising aspirational language seeking to limit
warming to one-and-one-half degrees Celsius).114 The agreement also
includes provisions on Loss and Damage, which refers to damage caused
by the adverse effects of climate change, by extending the Warsaw

107. See U.N. Charter art. 13, ¶ 1 (providing the General Assembly with power to
initiate studies for various purposes). This is not to say that the General Assembly is a
neutered branch of the U.N. system. Although General Assembly meetings may not
directly lead to policy changes on their own, raising awareness or creating a political
moment can prove extremely valuable. For example, the most recent U.N. General
Assembly meeting on climate change occurred at the end of June 2015. “The main
objective of the [e]vent was to contribute to building political momentum for an
ambitious climate agreement . . . .” President’s Summary of High-Level Event on Climate
Change 1 (July 24, 2015), http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/
11/Climate-Change-Summary-30-July-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/BP9D-QD4Q].
108. A 1950 General Assembly resolution created the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees. G.A. Res. 428 (V), Statute of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1950).
109. See id. annex ¶ 1 (describing the UNHCR’s responsibilities); id. ¶ 6(A)(ii).
110. The UNHCR has a limited mandate: “The competence of the High Commissioner” only extends to refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol. Id. art. 6, ¶ (A)(ii).
111. See infra section II.A.1 (arguing that climate migrants will not count as refugees
under existing law).
112. UNFCCC, supra note 9.
113. See Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php [http://perma.cc/4GWW-JN32] (last
visited Aug. 16, 2016) (“The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which commits its Parties by
setting internationally binding emission reduction targets.”).
114. See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, ¶ 17.
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Mechanism.115 The agreement only mentions displacement in passing;
the Coordination Facility was left for another day.116
4. U.N. Security Council. — The U.N. Security Council is primarily
responsible for maintaining international peace and security, which
could arguably apply to climate migration.117 The Council includes
ﬁfteen voting member states, including ﬁve permanent member states
that retain veto power over all Security Council actions.118 Although the
U.N. Charter ostensibly limits the Security Council to maintaining
international peace and security, the Council itself determines what falls
within its purview.119 The Charter provides that the Security Council must
act within the “Purpose and Principles of the United Nations,”120 but
most commenters agree that the Council enjoys nearly unlimited
discretion to make an Article 39 determination.121 Thus, if the Security
115. The provisions speciﬁcally do “not involve or provide a basis for any liability or
compensation.” Id. ¶ 52. Instead, the Paris Agreement extends the Warsaw Mechanism, id.
¶ 48, which essentially amounts to an agreement to keep talking about Loss and Damage.
The Warsaw Mechanism was the ﬁrst UNFCCC agreement to address Loss and Damage. It
primarily supports information sharing, gathers stakeholders, and makes technical
recommendations. See Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated
with Climate Change Impacts, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/8134.php
[http://perma.cc/Y4J2-RNG3] (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).
116. See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, ¶ 50. This is likely because mitigating
emissions was the primary goal of COP21; Loss and Damage was a secondary issue. See
Editorial, supra note 18. This might seem to cut against the importance of migration, but
it merely reﬂects the urgency of emissions targets after COP16’s failure in Copenhagen,
id., and that early migration faces causation issues.
117. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. The U.S. Department of Defense is considering the
security implications of climate change. See Dep’t of Def., National Security Implications
of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate 1 (July 23, 2015), http://archive.
defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-implications-of-climatechange.pdf?source=govdelivery [http://perma.cc/7W4V-KJEL]; see also Mark P. Nevitt,
The Commander in Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 437,
443–48 (2015) (discussing the security threat posed by climate change).
118. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1. The permanent members of the Security Council
include the United States, United Kindom, France, China, and Russia. Current Members,
United Nations Sec. Council, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ [http://perma.cc/
E7C7-MFAD] (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
119. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).
120. Id. art. 24, ¶ 2.
121. Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, before taking any substantive action, the
Security Council must ﬁrst determine whether a given situation represents a threat to
peace. Id. art. 39. The exact contours of the Council’s discretion remain contested and
beyond the scope of this Note. Many commenters believe that politics represent the only
true limitation on the Council under Article 39; others suggest that this discretion is
bounded to some degree by the terms of Article 39. See Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII
Powers of the United Nations Security Council 133–40 (2004).
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Council found that climate migration represents a “threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”122 it may then employ Chapter
VII powers, including economic sanctions (Article 41) and potentially
the use of force (Article 42).123
The Security Council has considered climate change on a few
different occasions, including two formal debates (in 2007 and 2011) and
two “Arria-Formula” meetings.124 During nearly all of the debates, the
Council has found itself divided—the United States, United Kingdom,
and France have all supported an expanded role for the Council; Russia
and China (backed by much of the developing world) oppose such
action.125 To date, the Security Council has taken no direct action on
climate change apart from a 2011 Presidential Statement, which
reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the primary body addressing climate
change.126 The Statement also expressed concern both “over the possible
adverse effects of climate change that may, in the long run, aggravate
certain existing threats to international peace and security” and for
“possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused
by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States.”127
This understanding could pave the way for future Security Council
action.
As the foregoing analysis shows, current refugee law and the existing
U.N. system are incapable of addressing climate change migration in
their present form. Part II presents and analyzes various (though
ultimately ﬂawed) academic proposals for addressing this pressing issue.

122. U.N. Charter art. 39.
123. Id. arts. 41, 42.
124. For a full transcript of the 2011 and 2007 debates, see U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess.,
6587th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1) (July 20, 2011); U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess.,
5663d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5663 (Apr. 17, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Security Council
Debate]. The closed-door 2013 Arria-Formula meeting received limited media coverage.
See Flavia Krause-Jackson, Climate Change’s Links to Conﬂict Draws UN Attention,
Bloomberg (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-15/
limate-change-s-links-to-conﬂict-draws-un-attention [http://perma.cc/K8UD-U9CP]. For a
discussion of the 2015 debate, see Dane Warren & Nathan Utterback, United Nations
Security Council Holds Special Meeting on Climate Change, Sabin Ctr. for Climate
Change L.: Climate L. Blog ( July 7, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/
climatechange/2015/07/07/united-nations-security-council-holds-special-meeting-onclimate-change/#more-3336 [http://perma.cc/2MSW-RRVD].
125. While the Group of 77, a loose block of developing nations created to promote
their collective economic interests, stood relatively united in opposition to Security
Council action on climate change in 2007, see Permanent Representative of Pakistan to
the U.N., Letter Dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to
the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/211 (Apr.
16, 2007), the group seemed splintered by 2015. See Warren & Utterback, supra note 124.
126. S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/15, at 1 (July 20, 2011).
127. Id. at 1–2.
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II. FINDING A WAY FORWARD: PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING
CLIMATE CHANGE MIGRATION
Given the wealth of scientiﬁc evidence supporting anthropogenic
climate change and displacement estimates, the world is staring down a
migration crisis of unfathomable scope;128 yet the existing international
law protections remain inadequate. Section II.A investigates the existing
refugee laws and the possibility of amending the 1951 Refugee
Convention to include those displaced by climate change, concluding in
large part that this option is wrongheaded.129 Section II.B considers the
scholarly literature recommending a new multilateral treaty to address
climate migration,130 including expanding migrants’ rights and funding.131 Given the glacial pace of climate talks on mitigation,132 section II.C
delves into existing U.N. bodies and their mandates to ﬂesh out a
potential role for the current structure of the United Nations,133
concluding that the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties is best positioned to address climate change migration.
A.

The 1951 Refugee Convention: Current Inadequacy and Possible
Amendments

The 1951 Refugee Convention represents the seminal international
legal mechanism protecting refugees, providing them with access to the
judicial system, public education, a right to work, and protection against
nonrefoulement.134 This section ﬁrst illustrates the inadequacy of traditional refugee law in protecting climate change migrants before
addressing the possibility of amending the 1951 Convention.

128. Even if one rejects the anthropogenic nature of climate change, the migration
issue still looms large (though this might affect one’s opinion on the responsibility of
more developed nations).
129. Previous amendments have not fundamentally changed the Convention. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee
Convention).
130. This Note will focus on three academic proposals: Biermann & Boas, supra note
45; Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45; and Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57.
131. In reviewing the proposals, Professor Wyman divided her evaluation between the
“rights gap” and “funding gap” that climate migrants face. See Wyman, Responses, supra
note 40, at 175–85.
132. See, e.g., John Vidal, Suzanne Goldenberg & Jonathan Watts, Copenhagen
Climate Change Talks Stall, Guardian (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2009/dec/14/copenhagen-climate-change-talks-stall [http://perma.cc/
5KWG-4CJX].
133. Section II.C considers the U.N. General Assembly, the UNHCR, the UNFCCC,
and the U.N. Security Council.
134. For introductory discussion on the Convention generally, see supra section I.B.
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1. Existing Refugee Law and a Legal Gap for Climate Change Migrants. —
Despite a few potential (very narrow) scenarios,135 the vast majority of
climate change migrants will almost certainly not ﬁt the 1951 Refugee
Convention’s deﬁnition, which requires that applicants have a “wellfounded fear” of persecution coming from their own government on the basis
of “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.”136
While a small subset of commenters suggests that climate migrants
ﬁt under existing law,137 the majority of commenters reject this view.138 In
fact, the New Zealand High Court recently held that a Kiribati man
ﬂeeing to New Zealand could not claim refugee status under the 1951
Convention,139 ﬁnding the claims “novel” but “unconvincing.”140 While
this decision would not bind other courts,141 it reﬂects the majority
opinion. Some commenters have argued that the simplest solution to the
climate migration issue would be to amend the existing 1951
Convention,142 which has been amended previously to account for
changing global consensus. In 1967, the parties to the 1951 Convention
amended the agreement to eliminate a temporal limitation that only
covered persecution prior to 1951 but left the core elements of the

135. See supra notes 96–104 (noting narrow circumstances in which the 1951
Convention would apply).
136. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, art. 1.
137. See Heather Alexander & Jonathan Simon, “Unable to Return” in the 1951
Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change, 26 Fla. J. Int’l L. 531, 571
(2014) (arguing that “forced migrants will qualify for refugee status, though they will not
be persecuted”); Jessica B. Cooper, Student Article, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the
Requirements of the Refugee Deﬁnition, 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 480, 488 (1998) (arguing that
expansion “may require no more than an easy extension of human rights policy”).
138. See, e.g., Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 358 (noting the majority
opinion that climate migrants would not meet Refugee Convention’s deﬁnition); Wyman,
Responses, supra note 40, at 179 (explaining the difficulties of categorizing climate
migrants under the deﬁnition provided by the Refugee Convention).
139. Teitiota v. Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus. Innovation & Emp’t [2013] NZHC
3125 at [51].
140. Id.; see Xing-Yin Ni, Note, A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for “Climate
Change Refugees,” 38 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 329, 342–43 (2015) (describing the result
of Teitiota’s case); see also Tara Brady, World’s First Climate Change Refugee: Paciﬁc
Islander Asks New Zealand for Asylum as He Claims His Home Will Be Engulfed by Rising
Seas, Daily Mail (Oct. 17, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2464282/Climate-change-refugee-Paciﬁc-Islander-asks-New-Zealand-asylum.html [http://
perma.cc/F8P6-SV88].
141. See Zicherman v. Korea Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (noting that “we
have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation . . . the postratiﬁcation understanding of the contracting parties”).
142. See, e.g., Gaim Kibreab, Climate Change and Human Migration: A Tenuous
Relationship?, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 357, 401 (2010) (arguing an environmentallydisplaced-person crisis “can be met within the framework of the existing international
protection regime”).
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refugee deﬁnition unchanged.143 However, such an action has run into
staunch criticism144 and might prove just as difficult as negotiating an
entirely new treaty.145
In lieu of a global solution, regional organizations could expand the
1951 Refugee Convention’s deﬁnition on a local basis, although such an
expansion would be limited in application. Two regional bodies have
taken this path. The African Union146 has expanded the deﬁnition to
include those leaving their country of origin “owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
the public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality.”147 Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration, a nonbinding
declaration adopted by nations in Central America, expands the refugee
deﬁnition to include “persons who have ﬂed their country because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence,
foreign aggression, internal conﬂicts, massive violations of human rights
or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”148 Under
either expanded deﬁnition, a natural disaster could arguably constitute a
circumstance that “disturb[s] the public order,”149 but neither was
explicitly intended to cover environmental displacement.150

143. The original 1951 Convention Protocol was a product of World War II and only
covered persecution that occurred prior to 1951. This limitation was eliminated in 1967.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
144. Breanne Compton, Note, The Rising Tide of Environmental Migrants: Our
National Responsibilities, 25 Colo. Nat. Resources Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. 357, 371–72
(2014) (describing various arguments against expanding the existing refugee deﬁnition,
including weakening the rights of existing refugees).
145. See infra section II.A.2 (discussing modification of the 1951 Refugee Convention).
146. AU in a Nutshell, African Union, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell [http://
perma.cc/3M8A-ZXYN] (last visited Aug. 17, 2016) (describing the goals of continental
uniﬁcation and removing vestiges of colonization).
147. Convention Governing the Speciﬁc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. 1,
¶ 2, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 (emphasis added).
148. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection
of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama art. III, ¶ 3, Nov. 22, 1984,
http://www.unhcr.org/45dc19084.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasis
added).
149. See Atapattu, Climate Change, supra note 59, at 617 (arguing that “[i]t is likely
that those who ﬂee natural disasters such as a tsunami or an earthquake” would meet the
“public order” deﬁnition).
150. See Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 J. Envtl. L.
& Litig. 19, 21 (2010) (noting neither agreement mentions environmental issues); Fabrice
Renaud et al., U.N. Univ. Inst. for Env’t & Human Sec., Control, Adapt or Flee: How to
Face Environmental Migration? 12 (2007) http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/F85D742112C97E44C125741900366F86-UNU_may2007.pdf [http://
perma.cc/A46J-FLWZ] (“[T]hese Conventions only apply to individuals living within the
African and Latin-American regions and do not draw attention to environmental issues
speciﬁcally.”).
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Despite this, neither of the above expansions ultimately provides a
silver bullet. Unhelpfully, both of these frameworks only apply regionally
(to Africa and Central America, respectively), not to Small Island
Developing States. And although the African Union deﬁnition is binding
on signatory states, the Cartagena Declaration is not. These regional
mechanisms aside, the text of the 1951 Convention and the majority view
of the academic literature suggest climate migrants will ﬁnd little
protection in existing law.
2. Amending the 1951 Refugee Convention. — One logical option for
protecting climate change migrants is simply to expand the existing
deﬁnition to include those displaced by climate change.151 The 1951
Refugee Convention protects individuals forced to ﬂee from their home
country due to “well-founded fear” of persecution on the basis of “race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”152 As discussed above, this deﬁnition is unlikely to cover climate
change migrants in its current form.153
On ﬁrst glance, amending the existing treaty might appear to
present the path of least resistance. The 1951 Convention already has a
well-developed system protecting refugees that provides for access to the
judicial system, public education, the right to work, and nonrefoulement.154 Further, countries already have domestic law implementing
these provisions.155 Additionally, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, which protects those displaced by war or conﬂict, could
provide the same support to those displaced by climate change.156 One
could even argue that the massive causation issues associated with climate
151. See, e.g., Kibreab, supra note 142, at 401 (arguing that the crisis “can be met
within the framework of the existing international protection regime manifested in the
1951 U.N. Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the 1969 [Organization of African Unity
(OAU)] Convention, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and the 1998 Guidelines on the
Principles of Internal Displacement”).
152. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, art. 1, ¶ A(2).
153. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (concluding most, if not all,
climate change migrants would not ﬁt under existing treaty deﬁnitions).
154. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, arts. 16, 17, 22, 33, ¶ 1. Nonrefoulement would protect someone forced to move due to rising sea levels from being sent
back to a home that no longer exists.
155. The United States joined the 1951 Convention (and its 1967 Protocol) in 1980, at
which time the Refugee Act established procedures for accepting and integrating
refugees. Refugee Law of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codiﬁed as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)); see also Kara K. Moberg, Note, Extending Refugee
Deﬁnitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protections,
94 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1128–35 (2009) (arguing that protection for environmentally
displaced persons should not come through refugee law for various reasons, including the
strain on asylum system and insufficient protection for migrants).
156. See The 1951 Refugee Convention, United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html [http://perma.cc/J2HY-PD42] (last visited
Aug. 17, 2016) (calling the 1951 Convention “the key legal document that forms the basis
of our work”).
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migration actually lend support to a more inclusive deﬁnition of
refugees, similar to the one used in the African Union, which would include a broader array of people beyond even climate change migrants.157
Despite these perceived advantages, amending the existing 1951
Convention will likely run into staunch criticism. First, many fear that
amending the existing treaty “would devalue the current protection for
refugees.”158 Amending the Convention to include a broad and inclusive
deﬁnition could also open up the ﬂoodgates and overwhelm an already
over-stretched system.159 Indeed, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has already spoken out against expanding the 1951
deﬁnition.160 While not controlling, the UNHCR’s position arguably
serves as a fair voice of the refugee community. Amending the treaty
would also provide protection only for a very narrow subset of migrants—
those who move across borders—as the vast majority of migration will
initially remain internal.161 Amending the 1951 Convention, then, would
face an uphill battle and if successful, would only protect a small number
of migrants.
While some perceived advantages could inure from placing climate
migrants within the existing refugee system, such a decision would likely
prove both too much and too little. It would prove too much because
causation issues and pushback from the human rights community would
stiﬂe any attempt at an amendment; it would prove too little because it
would provide only marginal relief by focusing solely on cross-border
displacement. For both reasons, the vital protection of climate change
migrants must come from outside the 1951 Convention.

157. See Convention Governing the Speciﬁc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 147, art. 1, ¶ 2 (deﬁning “refugee” broadly to include those displaced by
“events seriously disturbing the public order”); see also Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees, supra note 148, art. III, ¶ 3 (deﬁning “refugee” similarly). However, one could
just as easily argue that the causation issues caution against an expansive deﬁnition.
158. Atapattu, Climate Change, supra note 59, at 622; see also Compton, supra note
144, at 371–72 (describing various arguments against expanding the existing refugee
deﬁnition, including weakening the rights of existing refugees); Keane, supra note 63, at
215–16 (same); Moberg, supra note 155, at 1128–35 (arguing that a broader deﬁnition
would lead countries to “make access to asylum programs even more difficult, inhibiting
all potential applicants, not just [environmentally displaced persons], from qualifying for
asylum”).
159. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text (describing the overwhelming
Syrian refugee crisis of nearly ﬁve million people).
160. See Benjamin Glahn, ‘Climate Refugees’? Addressing the International Legal
Gaps, Int’l Bar Ass’n (June 11, 2009), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?
ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442 [http://perma.cc/URJ3-SGSZ]
(“‘When it comes to climate change and displacement’, [José Riera, Senior Policy Adviser
at UNHCR] says, ‘we have existing terminology and existing protections. We don’t need to
call people anything different from what they are, which is displaced persons.’”).
161. See UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 3–4.
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Multilateral Treaty Proposals

Having discussed and dismissed an amending Protocol to the 1951
Refugee Convention, this next section explores another possibility: a
multilateral treaty. Various commenters have discussed the possibility of
drafting such a treaty to address climate migration, though at present
there seems to be little international momentum to do so.162 This section
evaluates the prospects of a multilateral treaty.163
1. Leading Multilateral Treaty Proposals. — Similar to the 1951 Refugee
Convention, one could imagine a multilateral treaty (independent of the
UNFCCC) to address climate change migration.164 A multilateral treaty,
deﬁned as an agreement “between three or more states,”165 could bridge
the existing legal gaps by providing protected rights for climate change
migrants (presumably mirroring the provisions in the 1951 Refugee
Convention’s grant of nonrefoulement protection and providing basic
human rights, such as access to the judiciary and public education).166 A
new multilateral treaty could be speciﬁcally tailored to climate change
migrants and avoid conﬂict with the existing refugee community.
Very early discussions in this area advocated for a cap-and-trade
mechanism that would allow countries to trade allocations of displaced
people.167 Although the most developed treaty proposals discussed below
abandon that approach, the concept of a cap-and-trade mechanism in
this area is not particularly surprising—cap-and-trade is commonly
discussed as a possible strategy to cut emissions.168 More recently, some
have suggested that a treaty could allocate climate migrants based on
historical emissions,169 mirroring the concept of “common but
162. In fact, the international momentum seems to indicate a push toward addressing
climate migration through the UNFCCC. See infra section II.C.3.
163. This Note focuses on three leading treaty proposals mentioned in supra notes 45
and 57.
164. See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text (discussing sources of
international law and multilateral treaty deﬁnitions).
165. Aust, supra note 84, at 9. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
“does not distinguish between bilateral and multilateral treaties.” Id.
166. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 67, arts. 16, 22, 33, ¶ 1 (providing
various rights).
167. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22
Yale J. Int’l L. 243 (1997). However, one would do well to query the optics of equating
those displaced by climate change to carbon emissions.
168. The United States nearly passed a cap-and-trade bill in 2009, but the bill
ultimately died in the Senate. See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as
Energy Policy of Choice, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/26/science/earth/26climate.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
169. See Michael B. Gerrard, Opinion, America Is the Worst Polluter in the History of
the World. We Should Let Climate Change Refugees Resettle Here, Wash. Post (June 25,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-the-worst-polluter-in-thehistory-of-the-world-we-should-let-climate-change-refugees-resettle-here/2015/06/25/
28a55238-1a9c-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
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differentiated responsibilities” found in the UNFCCC.170
Professors Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas,171 Professors Bonnie
Docherty and Tyler Giannini,172 and Professor David Hodgkinson et al.173
have developed the most comprehensive multilateral treaty proposals in
the literature,174 but none provide the right combination of feasibility
and comprehensiveness to adequately protect climate change migrants,
and none of these commenters wrote with the beneﬁt of current trends.
Professors Biermann and Boas focus primarily on what Professor
Katrina Wyman calls the “funding gap” by emphasizing internal displacement funding.175 Professors Biermann and Boas treat the issue as
primarily one of development policy, focusing their proposed protocol
on providing ﬁnancial assistance to domestic resettlement programs in
the form of a “Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund.”176
While the proposal carefully reasons through the importance of providing funding for those displaced, by treating the issue as one of development policy and ﬁnancial support alone, Biermann and Boas do not
address the principle of nonrefoulement or cross-border displacement to
any substantial degree. Their proposal deﬁnes the group in question
underinclusively and then focuses primarily on funding domestic
resettlement.177
In contrast, Professors Docherty and Giannini and Professor
Hodgkinson et al. support a rights-based approach with expansive
[hereinafter Gerrard, America Is the Worst Polluter] (arguing historic emissions should
dictate responsibility to accept those displaced by climate change); see also Moberg, supra
note 155, at 1135–36 (arguing for an Environmentally Based Immigration Visa Program to
“allocate the number of immigration visas that each country should extend in proportion
to the percentage of greenhouse-gas emissions that countries produce”).
170. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12,
1992). The concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” continues to hold
weight, especially for developing countries. China and others emphasized the principle in
a 2007 Security Council debate. See 2007 Security Council Debate, supra note 124, at 12.
171. Biermann & Boas, supra note 45.
172. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45.
173. Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57.
174. Professor Wyman calls them the “three leading proposals” in academic literature.
See Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at 176.
175. See Biermann & Boas, supra note 45, at 79–82 (“[T]he best option appears also
here to be the creation of an at least partially sui generis regime for the ﬁnancing of the
protection of climate refugees . . . .”); see also Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at 211–
13 (discussing the funding gap).
176. Biermann & Boas, supra note 45, at 81.
177. See Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at 197 (describing the deﬁnition and
scope of Professors Biermann and Boas’s proposal as potentially underinclusive). While
Professors Biermann and Boas are certainly correct that most displacement caused by
climate change will begin internally, it will not remain that way for SIDS. Biermann &
Boas, supra note 45, at 73.
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protections for climate migrants. Both approaches argue for a binding
multilateral agreement that would provide nonrefoulement protection
for those displaced by climate change (modeled after the 1951
Convention),178 with rights expanding over time.179
While both focus primarily on extending rights to those displaced,
the two proposals do contain a few marked differences. Professors
Docherty and Giannini explicitly limit their focus to cross-border displacement,180 while Professor Hodgkinson et al. recognize that the
majority of displacement will remain internal and envision a “Climate
Change Displacement Fund” to support internally displaced persons.181
Professors Docherty and Giannini argue broadly for the creation of a new
international agency to protect the human rights of those displaced by
climate change, modeled after the UNHCR.182 Professor Hodgkinson et
al. more explicitly develop the institutional structure of their newly minted “Climate Change Displacement Organization.”183 Finally, Professor
Hodgkinson et al. recognize the special position of small island states
and suggest that these nations could negotiate bilateral agreements with
neighboring countries based on proximity, self-determination, and culture.184 While both treaty proposals admirably attempt to create broad,
rights-based protections for migrants, both would likely fail due to
feasibility issues and lack of comprehensiveness.
2. Evaluation of Multilateral Treaty Options. — An independent
multilateral treaty that creates rights and funding protections for climate
change migrants would likely fail for a number of reasons. First, such a
treaty would prove difficult (if not impossible) to negotiate, and negotiations would likely move incredibly slowly.185 Climate-related migration

178. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 377 (“[T]he principle [of
nonrefoulement] should prohibit forced return to a home state when climate-induced
environmental change would threaten the refugee’s life or ability to survive.”);
Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57, at 110 (arguing climate change displaced persons
“should enjoy the right to non-refoulement”).
179. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 377 (“Host states must . . . facilitate
naturalization of the refugee.”); Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57, at 110 (arguing that,
like the 1951 Refugee Convention, “rights [for Climate Migrants] should expand on an
incremental basis”).
180. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 369 (noting the importance of state
sovereignty).
181. Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57, at 84, 118.
182. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 388–89 (“In designing its structure and
policies, this [proposed] agency should learn from the experiences of UNHCR, borrowing
its organization and methods where appropriate and improving them where necessary.”).
183. See Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57, at 91–117 (describing detailed institutional
architecture, including ﬁnancing, committee structure, and rights-based protections).
184. See id. at 111–15.
185. See McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 48, at 15–18; see also
Martyn D. Taylor, International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? 138
(2006) (noting in the context of the World Trade Organization, “multilateral negotiations
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is sufficiently imminent that those who will be displaced (at least in part)
by climate change cannot wait for the development of a complex
international architecture with rights-based protections.186 Second,
multilateral treaties often provide only the “lowest common
denominator” solution to a problem.187 Given both time and political
constraints, efforts to secure the full scope of refugee-like rights for
climate migrants would likely fail. Third, a rights-based treaty would
encounter substantial (and likely insurmountable) political hurdles in
the United States.188 Instead, this Note argues for a regional approach to
the problem, coordinated by an existing international architecture, that
would provide the optimal protection for migrants.
Additionally, the incredibly complex causation problems in climate
migration would likely prove far too much for a massive multilateral
instrument to manage. In order for someone to attain “refugee-like”
status under such an agreement, a decisionmaker would have the impossible task of determining that climate change caused a speciﬁc event and
then pinning an individual migrant’s decision to move on that speciﬁc
event (in a situation in which poverty and other factors likely played a
role).189 Deﬁning a workable “status” under a multilateral treaty might
require narrowing the scope of those covered to cross-border displacement or disappearing states, for example. Narrowing the scope in this
way would inevitably fail to provide adequate protection for all those
affected by climate change displacement, as most of those displaced will
move internally, at least at ﬁrst.190
Due to the feasibility and comprehensiveness concerns discussed
above, a multilateral treaty that focuses on expansive rights protections
(like the 1951 Refugee Convention) would not fully protect climate
migrants. Instead, this Note argues for a regional approach to the
problem, coordinated through the existing structure of the United
Nations, that would provide the optimal protection for climate change
migrants.

would be slow, cumbersome, expensive and uncertain, frequently achieving lowest
common denominator results” due to the unanimous-consent requirement).
186. UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 3.
187. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of
International Law, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 323, 367 (2008) (noting fear of lowest-commondenominator solutions resulting from path dependencies); see also Raustiala, supra note
87, at 602 (discussing the “phenomenon of lowest-common-denominator treaties”).
188. See infra notes 253–257 (discussing the political barriers in the United States).
189. See McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 48, at 12–15 (describing
complicated causation issues associated with labeling someone a refugee under a
multilateral agreement).
190. See UNHCR Climate Report, supra note 40, at 4.

2130
C.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:2103

Existing Bodies of the United Nations

Having concluded that an expansion of the existing Refugee
Convention or a rights-based multilateral treaty will not sufficiently
protect climate change migrants, this section explores the potential role
of various U.N. bodies in addressing climate migration.191
1. General Assembly. — While the General Assembly represents the
primary democratic body within the U.N., it is ill suited to address
climate migration within its narrow mandate.192 Despite its limited role,
one scholar has argued that the General Assembly should take a lead role
in addressing climate migration.193 Professor Benoit Mayer argues that
the Security Council should pass a resolution “recognizing the security
challenge posed by climate-induced migration and the necessity for
international action.”194 Then, according to Mayer, the General Assembly
could create a global fund, agency, and panel dedicated to the issue.195
While it is true that the General Assembly has the authority to create
subsidiary bodies,196 such bodies are often tasked with implementing
speciﬁc treaties or providing support to governments.197
The traditionally limited scope of the General Assembly makes such
an expansive role unlikely. No other scholar has suggested a sizable role
for the U.N. General Assembly, likely due to its traditionally passive
role.198 It is true that a General Assembly–led program presents some
democratic advantages, since resolutions require a majority vote,199 but
the UNFCCC has similar democratic advantages and already addresses
climate change.200
2. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. — While the
UNHCR currently protects refugees from conﬂict and political oppres191. For an introduction to the legal mandates of these bodies, see supra section I.C.
192. The General Assembly has limited authority within the U.N. system—it primarily
makes recommendations and initiates studies, see supra section I.C.1, and has created
U.N. bodies to implement various treaties, see infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
193. See Benoit Mayer, The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced
Migration: Proposal for an International Legal Framework, 22 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. &
Pol’y 357, 410–15 (2011).
194. Id. at 411.
195. Id. at 413–16.
196. U.N. Charter art. 22.
197. See G.A. Res. 428 (V), annex, supra note 108, ¶ 8 (charging the UNHCR with
“[p]romoting the conclusion and ratiﬁcation of international conventions for the
protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments
thereto”).
198. Although they do not always directly lead to policy changes on their own, U.N.
General Assembly meetings often attempt to build a political coalition and advance public
support for upcoming negotiations. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
199. U.N. Charter art. 18, ¶ 3.
200. See infra section II.C.3 (arguing for a UNFCCC-led program to address
displacement).
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sion, it cannot actively protect climate change migrants under its
mandate to implement the 1951 Refugee Convention.201 Moreover, the
UNHCR itself seems unwilling to directly tackle climate migration; a
Senior Policy Advisor at the UNHCR recently stated as much in an
interview with the International Bar Association.202
While climate change displacement clearly has human rights implications and conjures up images of traditional refugees, it does not
necessarily follow that human rights and refugee law should address
climate-related displacement, as this would further fragment the response of the international community to climate change. Given the real
and persuasive arguments against associating climate change displacement directly with existing refugee law,203 this Note argues that the issue
should be dealt with through the UNFCCC process.
3. UNFCCC. — The UNFCCC is best suited to address climate
change migration through the newly proposed (but not yet fully
considered) Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility.204 The
UNFCCC represents the primary international mechanism for addressing climate change:205 It operates as the framework Convention under
which all other climate change agreements are situated.206 As noted
above, most commenters who have considered this issue have argued for
one of two things: adapting the 1951 Refugee Convention or negotiating
a new multilateral treaty.207 This is likely because most authorities
believed that the UNFCCC process could not handle this issue given the
historical failure of the UNFCCC system to properly address emissions.
Further, commenters have correctly noted that the Framework
Convention was never intended to handle human rights issues of this
scope. As Professors Docherty and Giannini put it, “[T]he UNFCCC
primarily concerns state-to-state relations; it does not discuss duties that
states have to individuals or communities, such as those laid out in
human rights or refugee law” and “is also preventive in nature and less
focused on the remedial actions . . . needed in a refugee context.”208
201. See supra section I.C.2 (discussing the limited mandate of the UNHCR).
202. The UNHCR has argued against granting refugee status while recognizing that
climate change can theoretically lead to forced migration. See Glahn, supra note 160
(quoting Senior Policy Advisor at UNHCR Riera as arguing that for climate change
migrants, “‘we have existing terminology and existing protections. We don’t need to call
people anything different from what they are, which is displaced persons’”).
203. See supra section II.A.2 (discussing arguments against expanding the refugee
deﬁnition under the 1951 Refugee Convention).
204. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Coordination Facility
origins).
205. See supra section I.C.3 (discussing UNFCCC).
206. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (introducing UNFCCC system).
207. See supra sections II.A–.B (discussing common proposals).
208. Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 358; see also Hodgkinson et al., supra
note 57, at 77 (agreeing with and citing Professors Docherty and Giannini).
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While Professors Docherty and Giannini were correct at the time of
writing, recent developments make clear that the UNFCCC considered a
“Climate Change Coordination Facility” at the 2015 Paris COP21.209
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement focused primarily on emissions limits
(through the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions process)
and Loss and Damage; it left displacement for future consideration.210
However, given the current international momentum, the UNFCCC is
best suited to address climate migration.
First, by treating displacement as a climate change issue, the
UNFCCC has essential institutional capital that would aid negotiations.211
Further, by situating displacement within the UNFCCC, countries can
negotiate emissions targets and other climate-related issues in one place,
providing maximum negotiation ﬂexibility.212 Finally, while the UNFCCC
has not historically addressed human rights issues,213 the UNFCCC has
begun to tackle Loss and Damage and the fact that displacement was on
the agenda suggests the global community is moving in that direction.214
Given the timing of these developments in Paris, no commenter has
explored what a Displacement Facility might look like in practice215—that
is precisely what this Note seeks to do.
4. U.N. Security Council. — Given its expansive role in the
international system to protect “peace and security,” the Security Council

209. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Coordination Facility talks
leading up to COP21).
210. See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, ¶¶ 48–52.
211. The UNFCCC began operation in 1992, see supra note 9 and accompanying text,
and has coordinated twenty-one conferences with global leaders, culminating in numerous
multilateral treaties. See supra notes 9, 18, 113, 115 (citing various agreements negotiated
under the UNFCCC).
212. This occurred speciﬁcally in the Paris Agreement negotiations, in which small
island nations pushed for a one-and-a-half-degree target in exchange for concessions on
Loss and Damage. Mark Hertsgaard, In the Final Hours of the Climate Talks, a 1.5 Degrees
C Target Is Still on the Table—but Is that a Good Thing?, Nation (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/in-final-hours-of-climate-talks-a-1-5-degrees-c-target-isstill-on-the-table-but-is-that-a-good-thing/ [http://perma.cc/Y94Q-3K9Z]; see also Paris
Agreement, supra note 18, ¶ 48–52 (addressing Loss and Damage).
213. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing commenters who argue
that the UNFCCC was never intended to address human rights issues like it was forced
migration).
214. See supra notes 115–116 (discussing the Paris Agreement’s Loss and Damage and
displacement provision).
215. The only exception to this seems to be a brief but informative treatment by the
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law outlining topics for discussion leading up to the
Paris COP21. Jessica Wentz & Michael Burger, Designing a Climate Change Displacement
Coordination Facility: Key Issues for COP 21 (Sept. 2015), http://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/unfccc_climate_change_displacement_
coordination_facility.pdf [http://perma.cc/FD6J-7PD2].
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could play a role in addressing climate displacement.216 Various
commenters have addressed the Council’s role in tackling climate
change, though all of them focus exclusively on reducing emissions.217
First, the Council could clearly address discrete security threats caused
(to whatever degree) by climate change displacement, just as it would in
dealing with any other global crisis that threatens peace and security.218 A
few commenters have argued that the Council could go further and act
as a compliance arm of the UNFCCC to enforce emissions targets, or
perhaps create entirely new emissions targets independent of the
UNFCCC.219 Importantly, any Security Council action would ﬁrst require
a ﬁnding that climate change represents a threat to peace and security,220
a step the Council has yet to take. However, the Council has already
“expressed concern” that instability and sea level rise could create peace
and security issues221 and migration has sparked Security Council action
in the past.222
Political difficulties notwithstanding, the Security Council could play
a substantial backstop or enforcement role in addressing climate change
displacement. As the previous analysis shows, practical and legal
difficulties abound in amending the 1951 Refugee Convention or
negotiating a rights-based multilateral treaty modeled after existing
refugee law; neither would adequately protect climate change migrants
216. See supra section I.C.4 (describing the Security Council’s mandate and
limitations).
217. See Darragh Conway, The United Nations Security Council and Climate Change:
Challenges and Opportunities, 1 Climate L. 375 (2010) (discussing the role of the Security
Council in reducing emissions); Trina Ng, Safeguarding Peace and Security in Our
Warming World: A Role for the Security Council, 15 J. Conﬂict & Security L. 275 (2010)
(same); Christina Voigt, Security in a ‘Warming World’: Competences of the UN Security
Council for Preventing Dangerous Climate Change, in Security: A Multidisciplinary
Normative Approach 291 (Cecilia M. Bailliet ed., 2009) (same).
218. See supra notes 117–123 and accompanying text (describing powers of the U.N.
Security Council).
219. See Conway, supra note 217, at 399–407 (discussing issues surrounding the
establishment of a subsidiary body to enforce the emissions targets of the UNFCCC);
Voigt, supra note 217, at 303–11 (discussing the weakness of UNFCCC compliance
measures and competencies of the Security Council). This Note will not focus on the
emissions side of potential Security Council action—either approach faces drawbacks.
Enforcing UNFCCC commitments runs into delegation problems with the delegatus non
potest delegar doctrine. See Conway, supra note 217, at 399–407. And allowing the Council
to create its own binding emissions targets would run into criticism regarding the
antidemocratic nature of the Security Council itself. See Shirley V. Scott, Climate Change
and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is It Time for the Security
Council to Legislate?, 9 Melb. J. Int’l L. 495, 510–11 (2008).
220. U.N. Charter art. 39.
221. See S.C. Pres. Statement, supra note 126.
222. The Security Council has often justiﬁed intervention based on a connection to
refugee issues. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 5 (Dec. 3, 1992) (framing Somalia’s food crisis
around refugee concerns); see also DeWitte, supra note 41, at 234–36 (discussing the
security implications of migration).
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given the scope of climate migration on the horizon. Part III provides a
way forward through a cooperative UNFCCC solution.
III: A REASONED SOLUTION: UNFCCC, REGIONAL COOPERATION,
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Early negotiation documents for the Paris COP21 discussed a
“Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility,” housed within the
UNFCCC, to protect the rights of those displaced by climate change.
This Part builds on the broad strokes from these early discussions to
illustrate how a Displacement Coordination Facility would operate in
practice to best protect the rights of migrants.223 The negotiation documents represent the inspiration for this work, but no details were
provided in the documents and no commenter has developed an institutional framework around this issue.
Section III.A advances the argument in favor of a regional approach
to cross-border displacement, with a particular focus on the importance
of self-determination. Section III.B outlines the short-term vision for the
Facility, which would focus on soft-law approaches, funding internal
displacement through the Green Climate Fund, and long-term displacement research. Section III.C embraces the long-term goal: allowing the
Facility to act as a clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements
(and potentially to evolve into a more formal refugee system as
necessary). Finally, section III.C also outlines a role for the U.N. Security
Council to address climate change displacement. This Part concludes
that soft-law and regional/bilateral agreements would best protect the
rights of climate change migrants in a politically feasible way.
A.

The Case for a Regional Approach and Self-Determination for Cross-Border
Displacement

Before addressing the structure and purpose of the Coordination
Facility, including funding mechanisms to address internal displacement,
this section introduces a key aspect of the proposal related to crossborder displacement: regional self-determination. Regional agreements,
as opposed to a large-scale multilateral agreement, would grease the
wheels of negotiation and avoid the lowest-common-denominator solution that occurs in international negotiations.224
223. While a September 2015 UNFCCC negotiating document introduced a Displacement Coordination Facility, the Paris Conference did not address displacement directly.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, ¶ 50. This Note charts completely new territory by
developing an institutional architecture for a Facility that would use soft-law and
regional/bilateral treaties, along with internal displacement funding, to address climate
change migration. See infra sections III.B–.C.
224. See Blum, supra note 187, at 367 (discussing the lowest-common-denominator
problem in international negotiations).
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Regional agreements, rather than a large multilateral agreement
based on common but differentiated responsibilities,225 would allow displaced
persons a chance to retain some level of cultural integrity. While
common but differentiated responsibilities should certainly play a role,
those displaced from small island nations should have some say (at least
through their government) in their ultimate relocation in order to
preserve their cultural integrity.226 Some might argue that cultural
identity and integrity represent an idealistic (bordering on naïve)
benchmark and that climate migrants will ignore such considerations
when they are faced with the realities of mass displacement. However,
these background principles of international law should not be so readily
discarded. The concept of self-determination remains a central tenet of
international law—the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.”227 The Coordination
Facility should honor this by fostering regional or bilateral agreements
that allow for self-determination.228
Detractors would argue that under the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, those most responsible for climate change
should bear the largest burden in addressing its adverse effects.229 Under
such a formulation, the United States, for instance, should perhaps
accept the most refugees based on historical emissions.230 Some have

225. For a discussion of common but differentiated responsibilities, see infra note 229
and accompanying text.
226. See Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and
Challenges for International Law, 4 Wash. J. Envtl L. & Pol’y 1, 16–17 (2014) [hereinafter
Atapattu, Disappearing States] (“[I]n order to preserve nationality, cultural identity, and
territorial integrity, it may be better to relocate populations en masse, provided that this is
done in a systematic, cooperative manner with the participation of the population
concerned as part of adaptation plans.”).
227. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec.
Doc. D, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
228. See Atapattu, Disappearing States, supra note 226, at 16–17 (arguing that people
should be allowed to migrate en masse or individually in a migrant-worker program).
229. See UNFCCC, supra note 9, art. 3, ¶ 1 (“The Parties should protect the climate
system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”
(emphasis added)); see also Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s
Greatest Diplomatic Success, Guardian (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations
[http://perma.cc/56CV-R9WE] (“For China, a key sticking point was differentiation—the
concept that developing countries have less responsibility for climate change.”).
230. See Gerrard, America Is the Worst Polluter, supra note 169 (arguing America
should take the most climate refugees).
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even argued for a type of cap-and-trade for refugee quotas.231 Pigeonholing climate change migrants into certain parts of the world based on
quotas (perhaps based on historical emissions) could satisfy one’s sense
of fairness, but it might not represent the preferences of those actually
displaced, which ought to remain a primary concern.232 This has been
underscored by commenters such as Professor Jane McAdam, who notes
that “a protection-like response may not necessarily respond to
communities’ human rights concerns, especially those relating to
cultural integrity, self-determination and statehood.”233
Any international effort to help those displaced by climate change
should encompass the option for regional and bilateral treaties to allow
migration of populations within SIDS to move en masse to another
territory. Admittedly, the concept of en masse migration presents
difficulties associated with retaining nationality and whether en masse
migration would then allow for some quasi-statehood designation.234
Analysis of these difficulties is beyond the scope of this Note. But the
core point nonetheless remains: Those living on SIDS should have the
option to negotiate regional or bilateral agreements that would allow
people to retain their cultural identity. En masse migration certainly
presents feasibility concerns, but self-determination and preserving
cultural heritage are goals the international community should not
readily abandon at the ﬁrst sign of difficulty.
Countries like the United States, presumably hoping to avoid an
inﬂux of immigrants, might attempt to eschew responsibility for
accepting displaced people by providing funds to the Green Climate
Fund to aid migration (either internal or external) instead of accepting
migrants through a bilateral treaty. This type of xenophobia is admittedly
a concern, and a regional approach clearly relies on negotiation of
regional and bilateral mechanisms that may ultimately require a
231. See Moberg, supra note 155, at 1135–36 (arguing that any program “should
allocate the number of immigration visas that each country should extend in proportion
to the percentage of greenhouse-gas emissions that countries produce”); cf. Schuck, supra
note 167 (discussing refugee burden sharing generally).
232. While providing strong rights-based protection is a laudable goal, it would face
political opposition, see infra notes 253–257 and accompanying text, and ignores the
valuable considerations outlined by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, see supra note 227.
233. McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 48, at 17.
234. See Kittel, supra note 23, at 1246–50 (arguing for a multilateral treaty providing
for a “state-in-exile” designation). This option seems to borrow from the decision to create
Israel (perhaps the most extreme example of relocating a large group of people). See The
Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Office of the Historian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/
1945-1952/arab-israeli-war [http://perma.cc/XUA8-22D4] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016)
(discussing the conﬂict that arose immediately after the formal creation of Israel). This
Note does not advocate for such a solution but instead supports en masse migration to
existing states to retain cultural integrity.
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backstop.235 This also raises the question of self-determination for those
accepting migrants and whether state and local governments would have
a say in the matter.236 Political concerns aside, cultural integrity should
represent the underpinning of the Coordination Facility’s work, and
supporting regional and bilateral agreements would allow individual
small island nations to guide their own paths.
B.

Short Term: Regional Cooperation and “Soft-Law” Approaches

This section addresses the short-term work of the Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility, which should focus primarily on a
few key goals. First, the Facility should work with the Nansen Initiative to
support regional soft-law agreements to address early displacement.237
This would also include providing support to negotiating states in the
form of guiding principles, which could involve combining existing
mechanisms (for example, the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement and the Nansen Initiative’s Cross-Border Displacement
Principles). The Facility should also conduct studies on which areas are
most suitable for accepting displaced climate change migrants to allow
for en masse migration. Finally, the Facility should use existing UNFCCC
mechanisms to address internal displacement by ﬁlling the funding gap
through the Green Climate Fund.
Even if a Coordination Facility is created, some migration may begin
to occur before binding regional or bilateral treaties are negotiated
between states. In the event that this occurs, the Facility should act as a
coordination body, in conjunction with the Nansen Initiative,238 to promote a “soft-law” approach to addressing climate change displacement.239 Since the Nansen Initiative has created substantial institutional
structure, including guiding principles,240 starting from scratch would
prove superﬂuous. The Facility should build on these existing structures,
adopting identical or similar guiding principles when necessary, and
work with the Nansen Initiative to support those displaced by climate
change in the early stages. Since the Nansen Initiative is a
235. This “backstop” for protecting climate change migrants could come from the
Security Council. See infra section III.C.2.
236. While local stakeholder involvement would prove crucial, federal preemption
might be necessary (as with most immigration matters). See Patrick Healy & Julie Bosman,
G.O.P. Governors Vow to Close Doors to Syrian Refugees, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/us/politics/gop-governors-vow-to-close-doors-tosyrian-refugees.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing opposition from
state governors to immigration policy).
237. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing soft-law approaches).
238. See supra notes 52–54 (introducing Nansen Initiative).
239. See supra notes 86–89 (discussing soft-law approaches). Despite being nonbinding, a soft-law strategy might prove politically necessary in the short term and would
include political pressure to keep commitments.
240. Nansen Initiative, Protection Agenda, supra note 68, at 5–6.
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nongovernmental organization,241 a cooperative relationship between the
Nansen Initiative and the UNFCCC’s Climate Change Displacement
Coordination Facility would enhance the legitimacy and scope of both
operations. Since the Facility would ideally encourage en masse migration to retain cultural integrity, the Facility should begin early research
on which areas are suitable for accepting large populations (i.e., those
with adequate land and water resources without too many current
residents).
While one might argue that the UNFCCC should not actively
address climate change displacement since it was never designed to
handle human rights issues of this scale,242 this ignores the political
reality of the current situation. While the Paris Agreement essentially
agrees to continue discussing Loss and Damage,243 global leaders seem to
be honing in on a one-stop international body to address all climaterelated issues, which would include displacement and other adaptation
problems.244 Further, the Paris negotiations recently demonstrated the
value of allowing parties to compromise on adaptation issues for concessions on emissions mitigation.245
Additionally, the Coordination Facility would not simply replace or
supplement the Nansen Initiative. The Nansen Initiative, which is a
nongovernmental organization, focuses entirely on cross-border displacement. This “soft-law” method could combine the Nansen Initiative’s
approach to cross-border displacement with the UN Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement246 to create a holistic set of guiding principles
to address climate displacement. Finally, the Coordination Facility could
operate as the clearinghouse under which nonbinding agreements are
negotiated to ensure that climate change migrants are adequately
protected. A clearinghouse structure would provide states with selfdetermination and an institutional structure to support negotiations and
protect the rights of migrants.
Since most migration will begin internally, the Facility initially
should focus on addressing funding issues associated with internal
displacement. The funding gap could potentially be met through
existing UNFCCC mechanisms, namely the Green Climate Fund, which
was designed (in part) to help vulnerable communities adapt to climate
241. See Nansen Initiative, About Us, supra note 52.
242. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 45, at 358 (arguing against UNFCCC
involvement); see also Hodgkinson et al., supra note 57, at 77 (agreeing with and citing
Professors Docherty and Giannini).
243. See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, ¶¶ 48–52.
244. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the compromises reached
at the Paris Conference).
245. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the crucial political
compromise reached on Loss and Damage at the Paris Conference negotiations).
246. See Guiding Principles, supra note 47.
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change.247 While the Green Climate Fund has been inadequately funded
thus far,248 it represents the primary UNFCCC mechanism designed to
handle adaptation issues. While the Paris Agreement’s Loss and Damage
provisions “[do] not involve or provide a basis for any liability or
compensation,”249 developed countries seem willing to discuss adaptation
measures like Loss and Damage (so long as it does not expressly create
international legal liability).250 Finally, the UNFCCC has thus far acted
mainly in the mitigation context to reduce emissions.251 Instead of waiting for a natural disaster to occur or the seas to rise, the Coordination
Facility should proactively strengthen local communities where displacement is likely to occur by improving resilience and planned
migration/disaster response to avoid some displacement altogether.252
Further, domestic U.S. politics make it extremely unlikely that a topdown, rights-based treaty that requires acceptance of climate change
migrants will be ratiﬁed, at least in the near future. The United States is
currently in the midst of a wave of anti-immigration sentiment,253 which
arguably borders on racism and xenophobia.254 Additionally, many of

247. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Cancun
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action Under the Convention, ¶ 102, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1
(Mar. 15, 2011).
248. See Karl Mathiesen, Climate Change: Western States Fail to Fulﬁll Pledges to
Developing Countries, Guardian (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment-professionals-network/2015/sep/04/climate-change-western-states-failto-fulﬁl-pledges-to-developing-countries [http://perma.cc/MNF9-G2ZM] (“Billions were
pledged to help poor nations adapt to global warming but trust is eroding as countries
such as the US fail to put up the cash.”).
249. See Paris Agreement, supra note 18, ¶ 52.
250. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing compromises reached at
the Paris Conference).
251. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 113 (focusing on emissions targets).
252. See Wyman, Responses, supra note 40, at 204–15 (highlighting “responses to the
rights and funding gaps that might reduce the vulnerabilities to climate change that give
rise to climate migration concerns”); see also Nansen Initiative, Protection Agenda, supra
note 68, at 4–5 (noting importance of “disaster risk reduction, disaster response and
recovery” and “ﬁnding durable solutions”). Even those opposing immigration should want
to avoid a crisis that turns internal displacement into cross-border displacement.
253. See Jim Tankersley & Scott Clement, It’s Not Just Donald Trump: Half of
Republicans Share His Views on Immigrants and Refugees, Wash. Post (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/24/its-not-just-donald-trumphalf-of-republicans-shares-his-views-on-immigrants-and-refugees/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (“Almost half of Republican voters favor deporting all immigrants here
illegally and barring Syrian refugees from entering the United States . . . .”).
254. Of course, some might oppose immigration on economic grounds. See Jared
Bernstein, Donald Trump Does Not Understand the Economics of Immigration, Wash.
Post (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/19/
donald-trump-does-not-understand-the-economics-of-immigration/ [http://perma.cc/
ZZ5A-DNB9] (explaining the economic argument against immigration, which focuses on
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those who staunchly oppose accepting refugees from war-torn Syria also
deny climate change.255 At best this combination creates an additional
barrier to a rights-based approach; at worst it represents a source of climate change denial. Whatever underlies these positions (and whatever
their merit), it is unimaginable that the U.S. Senate would provide advice
and consent on a treaty that requires acceptance of climate migrants.256
Accordingly, the Facility should narrow its short-term focus to studying
the viability of certain areas for resettlement, along with supporting softlaw and regional/bilateral negotiation support. This approach might
even ﬁnd favor with those who are dubious of U.S. participation in
climate change negotiations.257 The solution proposed herein attempts to
protect climate change migrants from having to ﬂee to the United States
without a right to enter an already overburdened immigration system.
The proposed solution creates no obligation to accept large populations
of climate change migrants, at least in the short term, and would thus
prove more politically palatable to conservative factions in the United
States.

short-term decreases in wages for certain workers). This merely highlights the staunch
opposition to a top-down, rights-based approach.
255. Many Republicans deny climate change outright; others deny that human activity
causes climate change. See Dana Nuccitelli, The Republican Party Stands Alone in Climate
Denial, Guardian (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climateconsensus-97-per-cent/2015/oct/05/the-republican-party-stands-alone-in-climate-denial
[http://perma.cc/DB5X-A9XJ].
256. See Harvey, supra note 229 (noting that the United States negotiated heavily at
the Paris talks to avoid binding obligations and thus avoid Senate approval). This later
became a political issue in the United States when the Obama Administration formally
joined the Paris Agreement without Senate ratiﬁcation. See Chris Mooney, Steven Mufson
& William Wan, The U.S. and China Just Joined the Paris Climate Deal—Which Could Be
Bad News for Donald Trump, Wash. Post (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/09/03/u-s-and-china-just-ratified-the-parisclimate-agreement-which-could-be-bad-news-for-donald-trump/?utm_term=.ccc85c56a6c3
[http://perma.cc/5RJC-HL95] (“Some Republican critics of the accord say it is a treaty
that should be submitted to the Senate for ratiﬁcation, but the Obama administration says
that the president has the authority to commit to the Paris agreement just as President
George H.W. Bush did when he signed the [UNFCCC].”) Just as Obama could unilaterally
join the Paris Agreement on behalf of the United States, Trump can unilaterally remove
the United States from the agreement. See John Upton, 3 Ways Trump Could Abandon
the Paris Climate Pact, Climate Cent. (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.climatecentral.org/
news/trump-could-abandon-paris-climate-agreement-20711 [http://perma.cc/9QJLX36G]. Trump’s threat to withdraw the United States from the Agreement is particularly
credible because he has called climate change a “Chinese hoax.” See Louis Jacobson, Yes,
Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax, Politifact (June 3, 2016),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yesdonald-trump-did-call-climate-change-chinese-h/ [http://perma.cc/PQH7-WELS].
257. See David M. Herszenhorn, Votes in Congress Move to Undermine Climate
Pledge, N.Y. Times (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/us/politics/asobama-pushes-climate-deal-republicans-move-to-block-emissions-rules.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Republican opposition to climate talks).
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Long Term: Regional and Bilateral Treaties and a Role for the U.N.
Security Council

This section explores a long-term role for the Displacement
Coordination Facility. First, the UNFCCC’s Facility should act as a
clearinghouse for regional and bilateral agreements to address crossborder displacement. Second, the Facility should lay the groundwork for
a potential expansion to a rights-based treaty if regional agreements do
not develop quickly enough. Lastly, the UNFCCC’s Coordination Facility
could act in concert with the U.N. Security Council to serve as a stopgap
and enforcement wing to protect the rights of displaced people.
1. Long-Term Strategy: Binding Regional Agreements. — In the long
term, the UNFCCC should act as the primary umbrella organization
under which regional and bilateral agreements between states are
negotiated to address climate change displacement.258 Further, the
UNFCCC could even establish a panel of member states to review and
approve regional or bilateral agreements for the protection of those
involved.259 Regional agreements provide the most ﬂexibility for those
displaced by climate change, including ways for them to retain their
cultural identity,260 but the Facility must provide some additional
assurance that a regional or bilateral agreement guarantees the rights of
displaced migrants. The solution should be informed by current failures
to protect the rights of displaced migrants. For instance, Australia has
utilized the controversial practice of intercepting migrants coming into
the country by boat and paying nearby countries to accept them into
asylum camps.261 The conditions at these camps have been widely

258. The closest anyone has come to supporting this type of proposition is Williams,
supra note 64, at 517–20. Reﬂective of its time, Professor Angela Williams’s article did not
have the beneﬁt of more recent developments, including discussions of a Coordination
Facility, nor does she provide the detailed institutional framework contained herein.
See id.
259. Admittedly, this proposal could introduce autonomy problems. Treaties represent
a contractual relationship or a “consent to be bound” under international law. See Aust,
supra note 84, at 87. Reviewing treaties ex ante is not especially consistent with this notion.
Such a review process would prove appropriate in this unique context. The Coordination
Facility would act as an overarching entity to oversee the rights of climate migrants, but a
regional approach provides displaced people with autonomy and self-determination. An
ex ante review provision would compromise between the two approaches and ensure that
the individual rights of migrants are protected by regional or bilateral agreements.
260. See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
self-determination and cultural identity for displaced peoples).
261. See Papua New Guinea: The Camps Where Australia Sends Asylum Seekers, BBC
(June 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33114230 [http://perma.cc/
LPM8-GD9J] (“The migrants, who come from some of Asia’s poorest countries, are sent to
Papua New Guinea in the Paciﬁc where they live in a holding camp. There have been
recent allegations of violence, and mistreatment.”).
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criticized, supporting the notion that the Facility should play some role
in protecting climate change migrants on the ground where necessary.262
The primary critique of this regional/bilateral approach is that it
relies essentially on states to volunteer to accept entire large groups of
climate change migrants. Admittedly, without an international treaty
creating this obligation explicitly, as the 1951 Refugee Convention does,
this approach assumes a lot.263 However, the beneﬁts of autonomy and
cultural integrity necessitate that the global community gives countries
an opportunity, within a structured UNFCCC environment, to negotiate
regional agreements. In addition to the beneﬁts of a regional approach,
the political environment likely would not support a top-down multilateral treaty like the 1951 Refugee Convention.264 Moreover, the Facility
could lay the proper groundwork for a potential expansion. The Facility
could study which areas are most suitable for large-scale migration and
support regional and bilateral agreements before shifting toward a more
difficult-to-negotiate rights-based agreement.
2. Role for the U.N. Security Council. — Finally, the U.N. Security
Council could act either as a stopgap body to protect the rights of
climate change migrants if agreements are slow or ineffectual or play a
role in enforcing regional or bilateral agreements. Following an Article
39 determination that climate change displacement represents a threat
to international peace and security,265 the Council could wield its substantial enforcement power under Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter
VII gives the Council the power to use, among other things, economic
sanctions against a noncomplying party.266 The Council could act as the
body of last resort for climate change migrants absent a protection
regime, but this would likely run into substantial criticism from developing nations.267 Instead, a cooperative relationship between the Facility
and the Security Council represents the optimal solution.
Given the weakness of the UNFCCC record on setting and enforcing
binding emissions targets, some commenters have argued that the
Security Council should actively enforce emissions targets set by a post262. This is commonplace for the UNHCR, which supports refugees covered by the
1951 Refugee Convention. See G.A. Res. 428(V), annex, supra note 108, ¶ 8 (discussing
the role of the UNHCR).
263. See supra notes 80–95 and accompanying text (outlining the basic rights afforded
to traditionally deﬁned refugees).
264. See supra notes 253–257 (discussing U.S. politics with respect to a rights-based
agreement). The U.S. political environment might be more receptive to a rights-based
approach in the future, especially when the effects of climate change prove more acute.
265. U.N. Charter art. 39.
266. U.N. Charter art. 41.
267. Developing nations have voiced substantial resistance to the Council taking a
leading role on climate change, see supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text, although
this might change if the Security Council accepted a secondary role of an enforcement
entity of last resort.
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Kyoto agreement.268 This seems extremely unlikely, especially since the
emissions targets set in Paris are nonbinding by their own terms.269 While
some might question the relationship between climate change and
security issues within the Council’s purview, the vast majority of nations
(including developing ones) have recognized the link between climate
change and security issues.270 Further, forced migration as a result of
climate change arguably presents a clearer threat to human security than
climate change writ large does.271 Perhaps the best argument against the
involvement of the Security Council remains its antidemocratic nature, as
the ﬁve permanent members retain veto power over all Council
actions.272 This cuts against the Security Council taking independent
action but is arguably less problematic if the Council acts only in a
supporting role for the UNFCCC when necessary.
The Council could also legally create a subsidiary body to act as an
enforcement arm of the Coordination Facility. Delegation of authority to
a subsidiary, however, remains complicated by the delegatus non potest
delegare doctrine, which essentially holds that the Council may not
delegate that which is central to its own authority and must retain the
right to overrule the subsidiary.273 The theoretical advantage of a
subsidiary lies in its ability to divorce an issue from the politics of the
Council. But the fact that the Council must retain the ultimate authority
to overrule the subsidiary substantially weakens this proposal. Alterna268. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 217, at 398–407 (discussing a possible role for the
Security Council in improving compliance systems of UNFCCC on emissions targets);
Voigt, supra note 217, at 303–06 (discussing the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, in both its
design and compliance record).
269. See Paris Agreement, annex, supra note 18, art. 4 (using nonbinding language,
such as “parties aim to reach” and “all parties should strive to formulate and communicate
long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” (emphasis added)); see
also Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Implications of the Paris Agreement for Fossil Fuels, Sabin
Ctr. for Climate Change L.: Climate L. Blog (Dec. 19, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.
edu/climatechange/2015/12/19/legal-implications-of-the-paris-agreement-forfossil-fuels/#more-3936 [http://perma.cc/26TU-BSAC].
270. At the most recent Arria-Formula meeting, Brazil was the only participating
country to deny the connection between climate change and security issues. See Warren &
Utterback, supra note 124.
271. The current refugee crisis aptly demonstrates the threat to human security. See
Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Refugees Who Could Be Us, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 2015)
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-refugees-whocould-be-us.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “horriﬁc images” of the
Syrian refugee crisis); see also Chirstine Gray, Climate Change and the Law on the Use of
Force, in International Law in the Era of Climate Change 219, 221–29 (Rosemary Rayfuse
& Shirley V. Scott eds., 2012) (discussing human security and the Security Council).
272. U.N. Charter art. 27.
273. While the Security Council may delegate discretionary decisions to a subsidiary
body, the delegatus non potest delegare doctrine provides that the Council must retain the
right to override the subsidiary’s decisions after the fact. See Conway, supra note 217, at
400–07 (discussing a potential subsidiary body created to enforce emissions targets).
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tively, the Coordination Facility could simply handle enforcement on its
own terms but refer problematic cases to the Council.274
Finally, the Security Council could simply create its own climate
migration requirements under an activist legislative role.275 Though this
represents an option of last resort, especially in the wake of antidemocratic sentiments within the Security Council, it is legally possible.
The Council could also take a softer course and initiate a study of the
likely effects of climate migration based on the outcome of the 2015 Paris
Conference,276 creating a cooperative relationship between the Security
Council and the UNFCCC’s own long-term studies.
CONCLUSION
The issue of climate change displacement is one of startling
magnitude. It is also one that international law currently has no
mechanism to address. This Note considers which existing body of the
United Nations is best positioned to address the upcoming crisis,
concluding that the newly proposed UNFCCC Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility, perhaps in conjunction with the
Security Council, is best positioned to address climate change migration.

274. See id. at 405–07 (advocating this approach in the emissions context).
275. The Council has taken a legislative role in two previous instances. See S.C. Res.
1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (addressing nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling for international cooperation to combat
terrorism following the September 11 attacks). Some scholars have criticized these moves
by the Council. See generally Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”:
Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 542, 543–44 (2005) (discussing
criticism of the Security Council and accusations that it acted as a “global legislator” in
adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1540).
276. See Gerrard, Security Council Statement, supra note 7.

